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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2009 confirmation hearings for Sonia
Sotomayor's nomination to the United States Supreme Court, empathy in
judicial thinking has become a liability: incorrect, dangerous, and
politically loaded. Although then-candidate Barack Obama argued in
2007 that empathy was a valuable trait for a nominee to the Court,' and
* C 2014 Kris Franklin. Professor of Law, New York Law School. With much
gratitude to NYLS Faculty Workshop, especially Doni Gewirtzman; N.Y. Area LGBT Law
Faculty Workshop for invaluable commentary on early drafts; and to Michael McCarthy for
unreasonably helpful research support. Thanks, too, to research assistants Christopher Ferriera
and Chinnu Joseph. And none of my work is ever possible without Sarah E. Chinn.
1. The candidate stated:
Justice Roberts said he saw himself just as an umpire[,] but the issues that come before
the court are not sport, they're life and death. And we need somebody who's got the
heart-the empathy-to recognize what it's like to be a young[,] teenage[d] mom. The
empathy to understand what it's like to be poor or African-American or gay or disabled
or old-and that's the criteria by which I'll be selecting my judges.
Senator Barack Obama, Address to Planned Parenthood Action Fund (July 17, 2007) (transcript
archived at http://perma.cc/082Nfgx7Pcv). Announcing Justice Souter's resignation from the
Supreme Court, President Obama commented on the qualities he would be seeking for his
replacement, noting, "I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with
people's hopes and struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and
outcomes." Remarks on the Retirement of Supreme Court Justice David Souter, 2009 DALY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 317 (May 1, 2009), available at http:// http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
200900317/pdf/DCPD-200900317.pdf, archivedathttp://perma.cc/RY3Q-TYPG.
Comments like these set off a firestorm of critique from the right before the nomination of
Sonia Sotomayor was announced. See Major Garrett, Obama Pushes for 'Empathetic'Supreme
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then later, as President, cited the fact that Sotomayor's "more varied
experience" might make her particularly well-suited to the high court,'
critics countered forcefully that empathy was simply antithetical to legal
reasoning. Commentators insisted that empathy was "a poor tool for
judicial decision-making"' and that the President's desire for empathetic
judges "raised red flags that we ignore at our peril.'" Senator Charles
Grassley argued that applying empathy to a legal decision is equivalent to
offering "special treatment" and stated, "No matter what you call it-
empathy, compassion, personal bias, or favoritism-it can have no place
in the decisionmaking process of a judge."'
For these detractors, empathy necessarily gives one side an unfair
advantage.! In trying to define the term, Senator Jeff Sessions made this
belief explicit:
Whatever this new empathy standard is, it is not law.... What is empathy?
Is [it] your personal feeling that you had a tough childhood or some
prejudice that you have-you are a Protestant or a Catholic or your
ethnicity or your race or some bias you brought with you to life and to the
court? Is that what empathy is?'
Similarly, Senator Orrin Hatch claimed that empathy and judicial fairness
are wholly incompatible: "America needs judges who are guided and
controlled not by subjective empathy ... but by objective law."' Or, as
Senator Sessions more pointedly clarified, empathy for one party must
always equal prejudice against another.!
Court Justices, FOXNEWS.COM (May 1, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/01/
obama-pushes-empathetic-supreme-court-justices, archivedathttp://perma.cc/4ML3-HQPW
2. Remarks on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be a Supreme Court Justice, 2009
DAiLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 402 (May 26, 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-2009
00402/pdf/DCPD-200900402.pdf, arhivedathttp://perma.cc/T525-N2HJ.
3. Ilya Somin, Op-Ed., How Empathy Can Distort Judges' Thinking and Lead to Bad
Decisions, L.A. TmEs (May 28, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oew-
chemerinsky-somin28-2009may28,0,4921073.story, archivedathttp://perma.cc/3FXL-CAUE
4. Thomas Sowell, Sotomayor: "Empathy" in Action, TOWNHALL.COM (May 27, 2009),
http://townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/2009/05/27/sotomayor empathy-in~action/page/f
ull, archived at http://perma.cc/X7VN-7EY3 (contrasting empathetic reasoning with the "rule of
law").
5. 155 CONG. REc. 20,854 (2009).
6. Some go so far as to contend that judges exercising President Obama's notion of
empathy would violate their oath of office. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Empathy vs. Impartialty,
NAT'L REv ONLINE (May 27, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://nationalreview.com/articles/227590/
empathy-vs-impartiality/jonah-goldberg, archivedathttp://perma.cc/DSF5-2NVW.
7. 155 CONG. REc. 16,867 (2009).
8. 155 CONG. REc. 20,829 (2009).
9. Jeff Sessions, Op-Ed., Supreme Court Must Not Show Empathy in Rulings, J.
GAZETTE (July 21, 2009), http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20090721/EDIT05/307219932,
archivedathttp://perma.cc/8KXR-9Y6V ("[W]hen a judge shows empathy toward one party in a
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As the debate surrounding Sotomayor's nomination wore on,
arguments from the political left contended that empathy in judges did
not have to equal judicial bias. It could instead signal an ability to "be
mindful of the consequences of their decisions on people's lives"'o and, in
a phrase that was repeated frequently, to "put oneself in the shoes of
others."" Nonetheless, "empathy" has increasingly been treated as a
dirty word in the politics of judicial nomination and confirmation. 2 Less
than a year later, a New York Times political reporter opened his story
about judicial nominations by unequivocally declaring, "Empathy is
out."" Indeed, in the 2010 confirmation for President Obama's next
Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagan, discussion of her capacity for
empathy, as either a positive or a negative attribute, was studiously
avoided. 4
What happened? I am certainly not alone in believing that Senate
Republicans and other opponents of judicial empathy, whether
unconsciously or deliberately, profoundly misread the meaning of
judicial "empathy."" For them, empathy is a kind of personal preference,
courtroom, do they not show prejudice against the other?"); see also 155 CONG. REc. 20,677
(2009) ("If you show empathy for one party, haven't you had a bias against the other?").
10. Erwin Chemerinsky, Judging Demands Empathy Even from Conservatives, L.A.
TImEs (May 28, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-oew-chemerinsky-
somin28-2009may28,0,4921073.story, archivedathttp://perma.cc/3FXL-CAUF.
11. George Lakoff, Empathy Sotomayor, and Democmcy: The Conservative Stealth
Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2009, 11:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-
lakoff/empathy-sotomayor-and-dem b_209406.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9BVX-NYCC
("[Empathy is] the capacity to put oneself in the shoes of others [but also] extends well beyond
feeling to understanding."); Editorial, Commentary The Empathy ofJudges, DAILY REc., July
16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 29891424 ("Empathy allows the judge to place himself or
herself in the shoes of the litigants and better understand their concerns.").
12. Or in the words of then-Republican National Committee Chair Michael Steele,
"Crazy nonsense empathetic." Matt Corley, Steele on Judges with 'Empathy': 'I'll Give You
Empathy Empathize Rigt on Your Behind!,' THINKPROGRESS (May 8, 2009, 2:37 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2009/05/08/39363/steele-empathize-behin/, arhived at http://
perma.cc/GYB6-S9ZR.
13. Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking forEmpathy byAnotherName?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12.
14. Neither the word nor any equivalent term makes an appearance in the remarks made
by the President upon Kagan's nomination. Remarks by the President on the Nomination of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan to be a Supreme Court Associate Justice, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 360 (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000360/pdf/
DCPD-201000360.pdf, awhived at http://perma.cc/3UFN-Y6GT (emphasizing only Kagan's
reputation as "one of the nation's foremost legal minds" who "won accolades from observers
across the ideological spectrum for her well-reasoned arguments and commanding presence").
The nominee herself seemed to avoid discussing the possibility that anything but legal precedent
would inform her decision-making process. See Paul Kane, Sticking to the Law, WASH. POST,
June 30, 2010, at AO6.
15. Richard Just declared that the concept of empathy was "battered, vilified, and badly
distorted" in the Sotomayor hearings. Richard Just, The Empathy War, NEW REPUBLIC (July 14,
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based on identity categories such as race, gender, or class. Senator
Grassley's conflation of "empathy" and "compassion" with "personal
bias" and "favoritism" is telling. For Grassley, empathy seems to equate
to pity, which then becomes indistinguishable from personal bias and
leads inevitably to favoritism. Because no reasonable person could argue
that favoritism should have a place in the Supreme Court," empathy then
opposes (or even negates) judicial reasoning. In creating these
associations, conservative detractors" succeeded in removing from public
discourse any notion of judges as empathetic actors. Consequently,judicial empathy is now treated, at the very least, as difficult to discuss or
examine directly and, generally, as an entirely problematic concept.
This Article seeks to conduct a more serious inquiry into judicial
empathy. It explores the cognitive process of empathy, rather than its
affective or emotional aspects, and conceives of intellectual empathy as
comprising deeply contextual analysis." Ultimately, cognitive empathy is
an intrinsic element of judicial decision making. Research in neurology
shows that the brain processes the intellectual work of contextualizing,
identifying with and coming to conclusions about situations and people
different from ourselves (cognitive empathy) separately from the
emotional work of generating feelings of solidarity, pity, or joy in
reaction to the experiences of others (affective empathy)." Thus, while
cognitive empathy does not preclude emotion, standing back from one's
2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-plank/the-empathy-war, archived at http://perma.ccl
L3F4-4W7S. For well-developed examinations of judicial empathy in the legal academic
literature, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense ofludicialEmpathy, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1944, 1960-91
(2012), arguing in favor of Barack Obama's call for judicial empathy, and Lynne N. Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1649-53 (1987), asserting that empathetic
narrative is an integral component in legal discourse.
16. Commentators have certainly suggested that there is already empathy, and even
favoritism, at work in Supreme Court decision-making but that when it favors the majority it
remains invisible. See, eg., Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 20,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/magazine/mag-2OLede-t.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/S7MF-QDK6 (suggesting that Justice Alito's empathy "for people who are a lot like
him" went unremarked upon by conservatives).
17. Of course, President Obama's political opponents were not the sole critics of his
notion of empathy. In his New Yorkeressay, psychologist Paul Bloom took issue with President-
Elect Obama's 2008 letter to a little girl that stated, "I believe we don't have enough empathy in
our world today, and it is up to your generation to change that." For Bloom, empathy can lead to
overidentification, resulting in compassion toward persons and circumstances only when we can
personalize them. Bloom suggests that this effect can lead to poor policy and irrational
allocations of scarce resources. Paul Bloom, The Baby in the Well: The Case Agaist Empathy,
NEWYORKER, May 20, 2013, at 118-21.
18. In that way, this work is quite distinct from the theorizing of scholars in the emerging
"law and emotion" field. See infla Part II.
19. See Mark H. Davis. Measurng Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a
MulticultualApproach, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 113, 123-25 (1983).
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own context and stepping into someone else's is primarily an analytical
function.
Drawing upon this methodological discussion, this Article
demonstrates that cognitive empathy was a bedrock process for
foundational legal decisions; that is, it embodies core principles of
common law reasoning. The Article then turns to examples from an area
of law that has recently become highly publicized-civil suits brought by
children and their parents who claim that their rights under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 have been violated by homophobic
bullying in public schools.20 I review a series of judicial opinions and
consider whether, and in what ways, judicial thinking on all sides of the
question evinces empathetic reasoning. Where it does, I consider
carefully how, and with whom, the courts empathize.2 1
20. Antigay bullying gained significant national attention after a rash of well-publicized
suicides by teenagers who were, or were believed to be, gay. See Jesse McKinley, Several Recent
Suicides Put Light on Pressums Facing Gay Teenagers, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2010, at A9. For
example, one blogger claimed to have chronicled eleven suicides in September 2010 alone that he
claimed were connected to homophobic harassment. David Badash, Breaking: ELEVENTH
September Anti-Gay Hate-Related Teen Suicide, NEW CIV. RTs. MOVEMENT (Oct. 11, 2010, 2:41
PM), http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/breaking-eleventh=september-anti-gay-hate-related-
teen-suicide/bigotry-watch/201/100/11/13606, archived at http://perma.cc/N3RS-B79L. From
these incidents sprang an explosion of media attention. In some instances, there were attempts to
prosecute the alleged bullies, which naturally garnered further attention. See Susan Donaldson
James, Jamey Rodemeyer Suicide: Police Consider Cnminal Bullying Charges, ABC NEWS
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/jamey-rodemeyer-suicide-ny-police-open-crimlinal-
investigation/story?id=14580832, archivedathttp://perma.cc/W3U8-SQ7S. Most notable among
these prosecutions was initiated following the death of Tyler Clementi, who jumped from the
George Washington Bridge after being filmed having a sexual encounter with a man by his
college roommate; Clementi's roommate was subsequently convicted and sentenced under New
Jersey's bias intimidation law. Kate Zernike, ury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate
Cnme, N.Y TIMEs, Mar. 17, 2012, at Al; Kate Zernike, 30-Day Term for Spying on Roommate at
Rutgers, N.Y TIMES, May 22, 2012, at Al.
Attention to the difficulties faced by bullied gay teens prompted writer Dan Savage to found
the It Gets Better Project in order to "inspire hope for young people facing harassment." WhatIs
the It Gets Better Project., IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.org/pages/about-it-
gets-better-project (last visited Aug. 1, 2013), archivedathttp://perma.cc/7HFP-RFRA. Recently,
the Project's Web site featured over 180 pages of video entries. In fact, public outcry over
homophobic bullying has generated such intense concern that public figures can face significant
criticism for not participating in the It Gets Better Project. See, eg., Amanda Terkel, Denver
Broncos Respond to Petition for Team To Produce 'It Gets Better' Video, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES
(Dec. 20, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/20/denver-broncos-tim-
tebow-it-gets-better-video n 1159101.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C8LP-Q8XX. Of
course, incidents of teens being bullied for reasons other than being gay have also gained
widespread media coverage. But homophobic bullying has been alleged in a disproportionate
number of the cases generating national coverage, and these sorts of cases are the specific inquiry
in this Article.
21. Of course, definitive empirical proof of any thesis requires data-driven analysis of
samples reaching far beyond one example. Not only would such inquiry exceed the scope of this
project, it would likely prove impossible: interpretation of courts' empathy is by definition
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I focus in particular on a formative case, Patterson v Hudson Area
Schools,2 2 which provides an opportunity to contrast multiple judicial
opinions governed by the same common facts. This is exactly the kind of
case into which Senators Grassley and Sessions fear that bias, unfairness,
or extrajudicial feelings will leak, camouflaged by the language of
"empathy."" These cases do provoke strong feelings, but they also reveal
how a rejection of cognitive empathy24 actually diminishes the richness
and rigor of intellectual engagement with the law. Not incidentally, it
also compromises the quality of judicial decision making and our ability
to identify and counter the structures of homophobia that pervade
American schools.
After first considering the neurological research on how cognitive
empathy operates and its connections to definitions of legal reasoning,
this Article turns to a discussion of a number of cases concerning
subjective and is hardly suitable for large-scale statistical regression. Nonetheless, the body of
cases considered here is illustrative and was chosen because the cases pose a vexing and not
easily resolved legal issue amid a topic of great social importance and generally agreed-upon
concern. Reasonable minds of all legal and political persuasions are likely to be troubled by the
repeated victimization of adolescents, even while vigorously disagreeing about whether their
circumstances are governed by the application of Title IX.
22. 551 F3d 438 (6th Cir. 2009).
23. This may also stem from a concern that members of subordinated groups are
somehow more biased, particularly toward their own groups, than members of dominant groups
might be. This sort of presumption appeared to be at work when proponents of California's
Proposition 8 moved to vacate Judge Vaughn Walker's ruling granting a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the act. After Judge Walker gave a newspaper interview in which he
acknowledged having been in a long-term relationship with another man, defendant-intervenors
in the Perry case sought to have his decision overturned on the grounds that he should have
recused himself. True, the defendants' motion was carefully drawn to focus on the fact that, as a
man in a gay relationship, Judge Walker might conceivably have benefitted from the outcome of
the case or have a heightened interest in its outcome. For many, however, the very question
seemed to suggest that a homosexual judge was suspect and potentially biased in the case, while a
heterosexual judge would not be. See Richard Painter, It Is Bias Against Judge Walker Not Bias
of Judge Walker That Is at Issue Here, LEGAL ETmcs F (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:34 AM),
http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2011/04/it-is-bias-against-judge-walker-not-bias-of-judge-
walker-that-is-at-issue-here.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KTX4-ZS5P The federal courts
resoundingly rejected that notion, concluding that it was "inconsistent with the general principles
of constitutional adjudication," and that all citizens "have an equal stake" in a case affecting the
general public and determining the boundaries of a fundamental right. Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
790 F Supp. 2d 1119, 1125-26 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Similar presumptions of bias may have been at
the root of Fox News's widely publicized and resoundingly panned interview of Professor Reza
Aslan, a religion scholar promoting his biography of Jesus, in which he was questioned for almost
ten minutes about whether he, as a Muslim, was suited to write about Christianity. See Julie
Bosman, Odd Fox News Interview Lis Reza Aslan Biogmphy on Jesus N.Y TIMEs (July 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/media/odd-fox-news-interview-lifts-reza-
aslans-biography-on-jesus.html, arhivedathttp://perma.cc/9ZJM-2EA4.
24. The ability to see a situation from multiple perspectives, both dominant and
subordinate; the acknowledgment that current customs are not necessary or even salutary.
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homophobic bullying in schools. It then considers the initial district
court determination in Patterson, a circuit court majority opinion that
overturned the district court and the dissenting opinion issued in
conjunction with that circuit court decision. Patterson and the cases like
it offer a window into the workings of judicial empathy in an emerging
area of law, one in which the political stakes currently feel much higher
than in canonical judicial opinions or well-settled areas of law.25 I argue
further that the same mechanisms of cognitive empathy should be in
place in homophobic bullying cases and, indeed, that the cultural weight
of homophobia itself is the major obstacle to the effective functioning of
judicial reasoning.
II. EMPATHIZING IS REASONING
This Article seeks to rescue the concept of judicial empathy from
the (mis)definition that has been foisted upon it. I argue here for the
centrality of contextualization-of which empathy is a crucial and
implicit part-to the practice of judicial reasoning.
Empathy is a comparatively new addition to the arsenal of judicial
concepts. In popular understanding, empathy is an emotional response to
another person's experience and is frequently conflated with possessing
feelings of sympathy.26 The word itself does not have an entry in Blackk
Law Dictionary27 Empathy does, however, appear in A Dictionary of
25. This Article uses the homophobic bullying cases as examples of the consequences of
judicial empathy in action and accordingly is focused primarily on ameliorating that very
significant problem. But other legal scholars have focused far more directly on finding tools to
address serious and violent bullying in schools, and attention to the topic is rising rapidly. See
Lisa C. Connolly, Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools-Are And-Bullyhg Statutes the Solution.Z 87
N.YU. L. REv. 248, 273-82 (2012); Jon M. Philipson, The Kids Are Not All Right: Mandating
Peer Mediation as a Proactive Anti-Bullying Measure in Schools, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 81, 82 (2012); Yariv Pierce, Put the Town on Notce: School DistrictLiability and LGBT
BullyingNotification Laws, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 312 (2012); Daniel B. Weddle, You'r
on Your Own Kid. . .But You Shouldn'tBe, 44 VALPARAISO UNIV. L. REv. 1083, 1088-89 (2010).
26. This seems to be precisely the definition operating in critiques of judicial empathy
that equate it with inappropriate emotional bias. The commonplace elision between the two terms
may explain why those defending the notion of empathy in legal decision-making so frequently
feel bound to explain the precise difference between the two. See, e.g., Editorial, supm note 11
("A distinction must be made between empathy and sympathy. A judge may feel sympathy for a
particular party but cannot let it color the judge's objectivity. Empathy that gives way to
sympathy destroys impartiality ... .").
27. BLACK's LAw DIcIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009). In fact, it makes perfect sense that the
word is omitted: legal dictionaries view their role as defining legal terms, not defining terms for
the legal community. Even those who would include empathy as a component in legal thinking
would be unlikely to consider the word as constituting a term of art in the legal sphere.
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Modern Legal Usage (Dictionary)," and the definition in this text steers
us toward the meaning of empathy that this Article embraces: "[T]he
ability to imagine oneself in another person's position and to experience
all the sensations connected with it."29 In the same entry, the Dictionary
juxtaposes empathy with "sympathy," which it defines as "compassion
for or commiseration with another.""o As such definitions show, empathy
is not the same thing as benevolence or consolation. It is not "feeling
bad" for someone, nor is it a personal preference for situations that feel
familiar or that one has personally experienced. Instead, empathy is a
mode of interpretation that recognizes that judicial reasoning does not
emerge from a cultural vacuum.
This is not to say that there has been no discussion of empathy
among legal scholars. Indeed, empathy has been a significant element of
analyses in theories of lawyering. Susan Bandes, for example, has
written about the role of empathy and reasoning in law as part of a
growing body of work calling attention to emotion and law." And though
Bandes has written extensively about law and emotion32 and is considered
a leader of the field, she is hardly the only voice in a chorus that includes
28. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 312 (2d ed. 1995).
Note that the legal usage dictionary and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY have the same author/editor
yet define the term differently. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 601. This
suggests that the difference in including the term is not merely idiosyncratic, but rather stems
from differences in the projects of the two books. That is, empathy may not be a word oflaw, but
this does not at all mean that it cannot be an important concept forlaw.
29. GARNER, supm note 28, at 312.
30. Id. Indeed, similar distinctions between sympathy and empathy are drawn by
grammarians, see, e.g., Sympathy vs. Empathy, GRAMMARIST, http://grammarist.com/usage/
empathy-sympathy/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SUX2-KCPE, and
psychological researchers, see Carl R. Rogers, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of
Therapeutic Personality Change, 21 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 95, 98 (1957).
31. Susan Bandes, Empathy Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
361, 379 (1996). Bandes is generally encouraged by the conclusions of work acknowledging the
role that "benign" concepts such as empathy and compassion have in law, but encourages scholars
to examine the function of those concepts very carefully, lest we predicate too much decision
making on personal identification, which, as Bandes points out, in the American legal system is
most likely to privilege the privileged. Id at 375-79. Bandes' concerns echo those of social and
psychological scientists who study the effects of the "affect heuristic," which is a mental shortcut
used to make rapid, efficient decisions influenced by contemporaneous emotional response. For a
more complete discussion of affect heuristics, see Melissa L. Finucane, et al., The Affect
Heuristic i Judgments ofRisks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000).
32. See, eg., Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN.
REv L. & Soc. SCI. 161 (2012); Susan A. Bandes, Foremword to Symposium-Emotions in
Context Explonng the Inteaction Between Emotions and Legal Institutions, 33 VT. L. REv. 387
(2009); Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 421 (2008); Susan Bandes, Whath Love Got to Do With I?, 8 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 97 (2001) [hereinafter Bandes, WhathLove]; Bandes, sqpm note 31.
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Charles Ogletree," Eric Posner,34 and Cass Sunstein," as well as many
others. No doubt this scholarship was spurred on by Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan's plea for an examination of "reason and
passion" in judicial thinking." By 2006, in fact, the study of law and
emotion had developed to such a degree that Terry Maroney proposed a
taxonomy dividing scholarship into six approaches emerging in the
discipline."
But while the work of Bandes, Maroney, and others is an invaluable
contribution, it operates from a very different notion of empathy from the
one with which I am working." As Bandes observes, legal theory tends
to eschew emotion as "variable, messy, interdisciplinary, soft and
feminine, fact-based, difficult to categorize, and non-rational." 9 I tend to
agree with the work of Bandes and others who suggest that emotion is
relevant in law and vital to grapple with,40 and I support Martha
Nussbaum's conclusion that empathy and compassion must occupy a
central place in the ways that judges and juries assess the facts before
them.4 1 I also concede that it is possible that the emotional and
intellectual components of empathy are so intertwined as to be
impossible to fully isolate. However, I do not focus here on empathy as
an emotional process. Instead, I am examining the intellectual processes
33. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seekng Motivations To Sustain Public
Defendels, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
34. Eric A. Posner, Lawand the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001).
35. Cass R. Sunstein, Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law, 33 VT. L. REv. 405
(2009); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws ofFear, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1119 (2002) (reviewing
PAUL SLovic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
36. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress ofLaw,'10 CARDOZO L.
REv 3, 3 (1988).
37. Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field
30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).
38. Bandes, too, does not precisely equate empathy and emotion. Rather, she describes it
as a capacity for understanding another person's situation. Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging
and the Rule ofLaw, 2009 CARDozo L. REV DE Novo 133, 134 (2009).
39. Bandes, Whatk Love, supra note 32, at 101.
40. Eg., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV.
1485, 1490 (2011); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Comminent, and
Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 626 (2009).
41. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONs
444-45 (2001). Similarly, I would embrace Andrea McArdle's thoughtful analysis of judicial
empathy seen through narrative theory. Andrea McArdle, Using a Narrative Lens To Understand
Empathy and How It Matters in Judging, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 173, 205-06
(2012) (describing the "situation-centered" jurist as one who is "more likely to interpret and apply
rules flexibly, in relation to facts" and likely to exercise empathy).
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of empathizing in the sense of conceptualizing another's position, as
compared to sensingit.42
In fact, such a model of empathy is already imbedded in common
parlance. Meniam-Websterk Collegiate Dictionary, for example,
gestures toward this understanding when it defines empathy as
"understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously
experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another ...
without having [these] communicated in an objectively explicit
manner."" Understanding, awareness, and sensitivity may be
emotionally inflected experiences, but they also require a high level of
analytical activity.
The notion that empathy is a function of intellect is even more
solidly established among empathy scholars." Researchers posit that
what we think of as empathy actually comprises two distinct dimensions:
the cognitive and the affective.45 For neurobiologist Simon Baron-Cohen
and his colleagues, the cognitive component in which one understands
another's feelings and perspective may be even more significant and
powerful than the affective component of responding emotionally to that
perspective.4 In his examination of the roots of human cruelty, Baron-
42. Although McArdle's recent analysis of Bandes' work suggests that Bandes herself
has, over time, come to embrace a more multilayered process emphasizing perspective-taking as a
central component of judicial empathy. McArdle, supra note 41, at 177-78 (citing Bandes, supra
note 38, at 138-39).
43. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 408 (11th ed. 2008).
44. However, some researchers do contend that what others identify as cognitive empathy
can more accurately be designated by other descriptions. Alternate names for related capacities
include "perspective taking" or possessing a "theory of mind." Kimberley Rogers et al., Who
Cares? Revisiting Empathy h Aspeger Syndrome, 37 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS
709, 710-11 (2007).
45. The division between intellectualized or cognitive empathy and the emotional
components or affective empathy can be found as early as the 1929 work of Wolfgang K6hler and
Jean Piaget and was elaborated on by many theorists and researchers working in a variety of
psychological and neurological fields in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., Martin Hoffman, The
Contribution ofEmpathy to Justice and Mom] Judgrent in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 47
(Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987).
46. Simon Baron-Cohen and his fellow neuroscience researchers specialize in studying
the ways that cognitive disabilities such as autism and psychological/neurological conditions like
psychopathy are both strongly characterized by an inability to empathize with others, yet lead to
vastly different propensities for violence and psychopathology. See SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE
SCIENCE OF EVIL: ON EMPATHY AND THE ORIGINS OF CRUELTY 43-123 (2011) [hereinafter BARON-
COHEN, THE SCIENCE OF EVIL]. They link differing capacities for the two dimensions of empathy
to these very different results, suggesting that people with autism lack primarily the cognitive
aspects of empathy (hence may have notable affective empathy even while remaining confused by
the motivations and emotions of those around them), id. at 100-23, while psychopaths, narcissists,
and those with borderline personality disorder may possess intact cognitive empathy (and may
therefore comprehend the emotions of those around them) even while remaining untouched by
the emotions of others. Id. at 64-88.
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Cohen, who deems empathy "the most valuable resource in our world"
suggests that what distinguishes uniquely dangerous persons with distinct
empathy-lacking personality disorders is their ability to manipulate
others cruelly because of a recognition of their feelings (cognitive
empathy) coupled with an inability to connect with their victims'
suffering (affective empathy)."8
Medical imaging specialist Dr. Simone Shamay-Tsoory offers a
model in which cognitive empathy and affective empathy operate in two
separate neuroanatomical systems and determines that they are processed
in distinct areas of the brain.49 Shamay-Tsoory and her colleagues
compared brain scans of patients suffering from injuries in two distinct
areas of the brain, as well as uninjured control subject, and found that
those experiencing ventromedial prefrontal (VM) lesions showed far
more significant deficits in cognitive empathy, while patients with
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) lesions exhibited more profound impairment
in affective empathy.so From this study and the earlier work of other
brain scientists, Shamay-Tsoory concluded that in uninjured brains, both
cognitive and affective empathy are processed separately but
simultaneously."
Similar multidimensional conceptions of empathy can be found as
well in the psychological literature. For example, Mark Davis draws a
distinction between the "interpersonal" cognitive process of empathy and
the more "intrapersonal" affective domain.52 Likewise, leading
Interestingly, Baron-Cohen also sees an inverse proportional relationship between
empathizing, on the one hand, and what he deems "systemizing"-arranging facts and
experiences into categories and seeing the world through a set of rules and systems-on the other.
So, a cognitive focus on empathy tends to counter or counteract a perspective that understands
rules as speaking for themselves. Here, Baron-Cohen's work is much more controversial,
particularly with respect to his claims about the relationship between empathizing, systemizing,
and gender. Baron-Cohen sees a link between neurological patterns and gender identification,
even going so far as to hypothesize that autism is a kind of limit-case of male brain patterns.
SIMON BARON-COHEN, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE (2003) [hereinafter BARON-COHEN, THE
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE]. This is also known as the "extreme-male-brain theory of autism." Id. at
133-54. Many experts disagree. See, e.g., REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE
FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 85-86, 202-19 (2010).
47. BARON-COHEN, THE SCIENCE OF EvIL, supm note 46, at 153 (emphasis omitted).
48. Id at 15-19. In this particular text, Baron-Cohen describes empathy's components:
"Empathy is our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to
their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion." Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
49. See Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory et al., Two Systems for Empathy: A Double
Dissociation Between Emotional and Cognitlve Empathy in Infelior Frontal Gyrus Vetsus
VentromedialPrefrontalLesions, 132 BRAIN: J. NEUROLOGY 617, 618 (2009).
50. Id. at 620.
51. Thus a distinction between the two processes becomes apparent only when one of
those systems is interrupted, as was the case of her brain-injured study subjects. Id at 623.
52. MARK H. DAvis, EMATHrY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 15-21 (1996).
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psychologist Paul Ekman conceives of empathy not as an emotion, but
rather as a reaction to the emotions of others." He considers this reaction
to have three components: (1) cognitive empathy, the ability to
comprehend the emotions of others; (2) emotional empathy, which
entails actually feeling the emotions of others; and (3) compassionate
empathy, which corresponds to a desire to help others deal with their
circumstances.54 Cognitive empathy, psychologists posit, "enables
humans to understand and predict the behavior of others,"" which is, of
course, necessary to interpersonal interaction and to understanding social
behavior generally.
Taking other viewpoints into account requires more than just being
able to "walk in the shoes" of another. Experience is the product of
context; as Joan Scott has argued, "Experience is at once always already
an interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted. What
counts as experience is neither self-evident, nor straightforward; it is
always contested and always therefore political."" We understand our
experiences (and often the experiences of others) through a preexisting
worldview that is formed by any number of factors, including race,
gender, class, national origin, political orientation, age, and region.
However, individuals often consider their own context self-evident. In
order to understand the experiences of others, we also need to
acknowledge the unique context in which those experiences take place.
Regardless of its precise label and scope (which differs somewhat
across fields and even among academics within fields"), there is a
53. PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED 179 (2003).
54. Id at 180. Ekman goes on to observe that cognitive empathy is needed for either of
the other two forms of empathy to occur but that emotional empathy was not necessarily required
for compassionate empathy. In other words, it is possible to understand the situation of another
and desire to help even without entangling oneself emotionally in that party's circumstances.
55. Adam Smith, Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy rn Hwnan Behavior and
Evolution, 56 PSYCH. REc. 3, 4 (2006).
56. Joan W Scott, The Evidence ofExperience, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 773, 797 (1991).
57. Empathy scholars both within the same field and across disciplines approach the
topic quite differently. For just one example, Lian T Rameson and Matthew D. Lieberman
describe two strains of theoretical views that appear divergent in their field: a "simulation"
theory of empathy (which emphasizes intuitive experiences of another using ourselves as a model
and takes place in the mirror neurons in the brain) and what they term "theory-theory" (cognitive
mindreading, which tends to take place in the brain's prefrontal cortex). Lian T Rameson &
Matthew D. Lieberman, Empathy: A Social Cognitve Neuroscience Approach, 3 SOC. &
PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 94, 95 (2009); see also C. Daniel Batson, These Thngs Called
Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena, inTHE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 3, 4
(Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009). Almost all researchers concur that there are both
emotional and intellectual aspects of empathy. But cf Doris Bischof-Kbhler, The Development
of Empathy in Infants, in INFANT DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMAN SPEAKING
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consensus that there are cognitive or intellectual aspects of empathy and
that it is not merely an emotive response. All definitions of the cognitive
process of empathy focus on seeing a situation or set of facts from more
than one perspective and being able to think through a number of
possible modes of understanding. Does this not sound precisely like
what law teachers mean when they instruct students to "think like a
lawyer"?" Indeed, rather than leading to bias, prejudice, or favoritism, as
Senators Grassley and Sessions insisted, empathy can actually militate
against that kind of partiality because it necessitates intellectually
occupying and understanding the perspective of a number of different
subject positions.
Traditionally, when legal scholars and practitioners talk about the
building blocks of legal reasoning, this kind of empathy does not appear
on the list. Even though it may be implicitly understood that an ability to
take multiple perspectives and to situate analysis in context is
fundamental to legal reasoning, it is rarely articulated as one of the
central things lawyers do or that novice lawyers must learn.59 For
example, in The Five Types of Legal Argument, Wilson Huhn
enumerates text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy as the crucial
components to legal reasoning."o Huhn suggests that each element
represents different ideas about what the law is and how it operates, and
CoUNTRIEs 245, 245-73 (Michael E. Lamb & Heidi Keller eds., 1991) (urging a careful
distinction between empathy as it is broadly understood and purely emotional contagion).
58. In his remarks advising prospective law students about what they would learn, Jack
Chorowsky makes this link explicit:
Thinking like a lawyer also means seeing both sides of an argument or situation, and
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of every position. I've been amazed over
the years-in law practice, politics, and business-by how many people aren't capable
of intellectual empathy, of seeing the other side's point of view.
Jack Chorowsky, Thhking Like a Lawyer, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 463, 465 (2003). Of course,
critical scholars have also described legal thinking in broader terms, yet none appear to disagree
with such descriptions of multi-sided reasoning as a hallmark of traditional legal reasoning. See
Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer. Analyzing the Cognitive
Components oftheAnalyticalMind 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 413, 468 (2007) (including the skill of
"seeing all sides" as but one component among many constitutive parts of legal reasoning). See
genemlly Peggy Cooper Davis & Aderson Belgarde Francois, ThinkhgLike a Lawyer, 81 N.D. L.
REv. 795 (2005) (arguing for the importance of intellectual versatility in legal thinking and
training); David T ButleRitchie, Situating "7hinking Like a Lawyer" Within Legal Pedagogy, 50
CLEv. ST. L. REv. 29, 45-56 (2003) (responding to earlier critics who contended that traditional
conceptions of legal thinking were defined too narrowly by explaining the value of training
lawyers to understand positions within the adversarial system of American law).
59. Although, at least one introductory legal methods text does extensively quote the
writings of Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Montesquieu, Blackstone, and others in a searching inquiry
about empathy, passion, and reason in modern jurisprudence. See EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E.
HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 73-102 (2d ed. 2010).
60. WILSON HUHN, THE FivE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13, 17-71 (2d ed. 2008).
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together these elements are sufficient to form a comprehensive
methodology for understanding and constructing legal arguments." Any
number of other texts follow analogous schemes to teach students how to
"think like a lawyer." None lists "empathy" among its required
attributes."
Indeed, strikingly, some of the introductory texts intended to
familiarize beginning law students with the processes of legal thinking"
appear to gloss over factual contexts as an essential part of building a
legal argument. Though such texts may speak in detail about how to read
a statute or legal rule," synthesize cases," touch briefly on the policy
implications of legal reasoning," and sometimes describe the ethical
boundaries of lawyers' arguments," these analyses rarely talk in much
detail about how lawyers actually go about engaging with the facts of
their cases." Perhaps such consideration is deemed too sophisticated or
premature for beginning readers. Nevertheless, a consistent message
emerges: the individual and/or social circumstances of cases are a
distraction from the real work of understanding how legal reasoning is
developed. Little wonder, then, that critics can read contextual
consideration as nonlegal and therefore suspect.
Nonetheless, when we look at the ways legal education actually
operates, this seems less and less to describe what actually happens in the
discourse of legal training, where consideration of the nuances of cases'
contexts forms a central part of our "signature pedagogy" And though
the consideration of factual frameworks is perhaps subterranean in some
61. See id. at 7-16.
62. See, e.g., PETER T. WENDEL, DECONSTRUCTING LEGAL ANALYSIS: A IL PRIMER 18-19
(2009) (dividing legal analysis into the "rule plane" and the "factual plane"); PATRICK M.
MCFADDEN, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2001) (focusing
on the law and the facts); STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
(2d ed. 1995) (focusing on traditional logic as the basis of legal reasoning).
63. Analyzed here because, as tools for indoctrinating law students into the otherwise-
hidden means of legal analysis, they seem to constitute the best sources available for
understanding how the legal community expresses those processes to itselfthrough its novices.
64. Eg., LISSA GRIFFIN & BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, THE LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE: LAW,
LEGAL REASONING, AND LAWYERING 26-32 (2000).
65. WENDEL, supra note 62, at 149-54.
66. ALBERT J. MOORE & DAVID A. BINDER, DEMYSTIFYING THE FIRST YEAR OF LAW
SCHOOL 30-31 (2010).
67. JAMES E. MOLITERNO & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW, LAW STUDY,
AND THE LAWYER'S ROLE 7-11, 20-30 (2d ed. 2004).
68. Perhaps it is these reductions that the critical scholars seeking to expand the meaning
of "thinking like a lawyer" are responding to? See sources cited supra note 58.
69. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 47-74 (2007) (hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (providing a close analysis of
sensitivity to factual reasoning in classrooms that use the Socratic Method).
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descriptions of legal thinking, legal scholars still seem to agree that it is
imperative. Most of the sources purporting to explain legal reasoning to
entering law students contend that considering facts carefully is
foundational to crafting legal arguments."o Moreover, a significant part
of "considering facts carefully" is understanding the larger context in
which they arise. Without context we cannot fully understand what a
given set of facts means to either party to a dispute and consequently
cannot develop the rich legal analysis to which beginning law students
are urged to aspire. Indeed, context is what makes a factual narrative-
without it the facts cannot be fully understood.
Thus, when we try to describe to novice lawyers what legal
reasoning is and how they can successfully integrate it into their own
thinking, facts play an enormous role. Even in the most basic building
blocks of analytical and analogical reasoning, we cannot avoid the
materiality of facts." Let us take that classic example of logical
reasoning:72 All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore
Socrates is mortal." Texts for legal audiences generally portray
deductions of this kind as emphasizing the interpretation of universal
legal principles rather than the facts of given cases.74 But such a
depiction presupposes that we can all agree on the first two premises, at
least one of which, Socrates is a man, is a matter of immediately provable
fact.
But of course, not all deductive reasoning is based in such solid
fact. Even in this allegedly simple illustration, there might be ways to
question the facts of the supposedly universally understood premises on
70. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 62, at 18-19; McFADDEN, supra note 62, at 98-108;
BURTON, supre note 62, at 29-52. For an unusually detailed examination of factual analysis as a
component of legal reasoning, see BRADLEY J. CHARLES, APPLYING LAW 3-11, 26-29, 33-35, 39-
42,50 (2011).
71. BestPractices for Legal Education encourages Socratic dialogue in the law classroom
to follow a four-step process stemming from having students "state the case" under consideration
as a predicate to engaging in a "FARF" analysis, in which the class will closely consider the "fact-
and-rule-fit" of the case's reasoning. Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION 213-16 (2007) (drawing heavily from Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest
Steinglass, A DialogueAbout Socrdtic Teaching, 23 N.YU. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1997)).
72. "Analytical" here is distinguished from the other most common form of legal
reasoning, "analogical" comparisons of similar facts, which should presumably lead to similar
outcomes.
73. This syllogism can be found repeatedly in expositions of the process of legal
reasoning, almost to the point of becoming clich6d. For one recent example, see TRACEY E.
GEORGE & SUZANNA SHERRY, WHAT EVERY LAw STUDENT REALLY NEEDS To KNow 86-89
(2009).
74. Seeid. at 80-81. For a more nuanced examination of the constructedness of the initial
premises in such a syllogism, see ROBERT K. MILLER, THE INFORMED ARGUMENT: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER AND GUIDE 25-31 (5th ed. 1998).
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which the analysis is predicated: Socrates could be a hologram or an
alien in disguise. The more complicated fact patterns become, the more
dispute there may be about what the facts are and how we understand
them. For example does "man" here mean "person" generally or "male
person?" Once there can be debate about any of the facts upon which the
premises to the syllogism rest, the outcome can be called into question.
Of course, it is on precisely these factual disputes that much of lawyers'
enterprise is centered (and not coincidentally, where things get most
interesting for law teachers and law students), because cases may be won
or lost on disputing such premises. So what we might, on casual
investigation, presume to be rigorous analytical reasoning" is, in law,
inherently fact-bound and fact-driven.
Turning to analogical reasoning the other most commonly defined
prong of legal reasoning and analogical thinking," we can easily
conclude that it, too, is necessarily organized around context. If
analytical thinking can be thought of as stressing rules (read: law) in its
premises, analogical reasoning is its counterpoint. This form of
induction necessarily takes the parameters of a legal rule as given and
focuses instead on its applicability to the facts at hand. As one writer
succinctly characterizes the process, reasoning by analogy in law has
three essential steps: (1) state a concept in common between the two
situations being compared, (2) explain the similarity or dissimilarity
between the two circumstances, and (3) explain the significance of the
comparison." On the face of this description, the most significant work
appears to take place in step three, in which the significance of the
likeness is analyzed. But any litigator understands that the real action
takes place in how the situations are framed in the first place." If lawyers
are to argue that a given case is in material ways comparable to or
distinguishable from another case, they need fact-based judgments to get
there. Are the facts of the cases different or similar? Are the contexts in
which the facts operate analogous or discordant? And, ultimately,
through what perspective can we comprehend the facts?
75. Meaning so universal as to be acontextual.
76. See GEORGE & SHERRY, supra note 73, at 80-89 (contrasting analytical and analogical
reasoning as the two most basic forms of legal analysis); MILLER, supra note 74, at 22-25
(explaining how this form of reasoning differs from deduction).
77. CHARLES, supra note 70, at 61.
78. For an examination of the ways that lawyers can strategically work backwards to
formulate effective premises for analogical arguments, see MILLER, supra note 74, at 28-30. It is
worth noting that it may be exactly this legal framing paradigm that law and emotion scholars
may be adeptly identifying and responding to. See irfia notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
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Thus, as I have suggested throughout this Part (and as is certainly
considered noncontroversial among legal thinkers), legal reasoning
simply cannot be understood without close analysis of the factual context
of a given case-our processes of cognitive empathy function to
foreground that context, after all. And "facts" cannot be understood in a
cultural vacuum. To return to the example of Socrates, what seems like a
transparent and self-evident argument makes sense only in the context of
binary gender coupled with a recognition that, in English, "man" has
long been used to identify human beings, not just male persons." And in
more recent days of increasingly complex notions of gender, how do we
define who qualifies as a man? What if Socrates had begun life as
female? What if he considers himself male but has not undergone sex
reassignment surgery? What if his driver's license indicates that he is
currently male, but this does not accord with his birth certificate? In
such cases, making that kind of factual determination is likely to be hotly
contested in any ensuing litigation. Determining whether Socrates is or
is not a man is absolutely necessary to the analytical syllogism needed
for a judge to resolve the case. And the only way to get to that
determination is through a careful consideration of the legal,
psychological, biomedical, and factual contexts in which the question
arises.
This kind of in-depth contextual analysis may not be required to
resolve every conflict, but the model of reasoning from context has
always been part of important legal decisions, so much so that it
constitutes a significant part of the methodology of training each new
cohort of lawyers. The work that law professors do to teach their
students to "think like a lawyer" finds expression in the cases we assign,
particularly in foundational first-year courses where much of the
socialization to legal thinking is expected to take place."o An examination
79. Without this understanding, we end up with a logically coherent but nonsense
syllogism like "all men are mortal, Diotima is a woman, hence we do not have sufficient
information to determine whether or not Diotima is mortal."
80. For example, the CARNEGIE REPORT, supm note 69, describes the case dialogue
through Socratic questioning as the primary means of promoting the "cognitive apprenticeship"
of lawyers and situates it primarily, though not exclusively, in the first year. CARNEGIE REPORT,
supm note 69, at 48-84; see also LEAH M. CHRISTENSEN, "ONE L OF A YEAR" How To MAXIMIzE
YOUR SUCCESS IN LAW SCHOOL 5-8 (2012) (describing the Socratic Method as central to teaching
law students how to think like a lawyer and situating the methodology as particularly pronounced
in the first year); AUSTEN L. PARRISH & CRISTINA C. KNOLTON, HARD-NOSED ADVICE FROM A
CRANKY LAW PROFESSOR: How To SUCCEED IN LAW SCHOOL 8 (2010) ("Most first-year courses
are structured to teach you how to do legal analysis. . . .").
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of the kinds of cases that repeatedly turn up in first-year casebooks finds
abundant examples of opinions that integrate contextual analysis."'
Consider the classic torts decision The TJ Hooper,8 2 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a majority
decision written by Learned Hand, took for granted the context of
technological change. The case itself depends upon questions of the
seaworthiness of two tugboats and the coal barges they were pulling from
Virginia up the Atlantic seaboard until run aground by storms just
outside the Delaware breakwater." Other boats had avoided the storm by
listening in to weather reports on the radio, but the T.J. HOOPER and her
sister tugboat the MONTROSE did not have working radios and did not
know about the approaching storm.84 At the time, radio receivers were
fairly new and were not standard issue in tugboats, so the defendants
argued that the general industry custom not to equip such boats with
radios meant that they could not have breached a duty of care simply by
failing to provide such radios to their crews."
However, Judge Hand recast the issue. By 1932, when the case was
decided, radios were inexpensive and readily available. The court was
well aware of this context. Ultimately, Judge Hand determined, although
the "whole calling [of tugboat operators] may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available devices,"" it was not enough to point to
shippers' historical practice. Rather, all boats risk storms, and radios can
81. The examples given below are drawn from the most commonly taught first-semester
civil law classes-torts and contracts. I chose these disciplines in part because they are so central
to our images of foundational legal education, but also because they are ones in which the courts
have the least stake in the outcome. That is, to avoid bias, in civil cases we presume that courts
may empathize (and sympathize) equally with both parties in any given case. Anyone might
conceivably become either a tortfeasor or an injured party; any contract can go awry. A typical
judge's personal identifications might seem different in, say, a criminal case. I have also selected
cases written by some of our most respected jurists, Learned Hand and Benjamin N. Cardozo,
because legal educators frequently point to their writings as examples of outstanding legal
reasoning that beginning lawyers ought to strive to emulate.
82. "Classic" is not an overstatement: this case appears in virtually every Torts textbook.
Of thirteen current Torts casebooks on my shelves only one does not include this case: HARRY
SHULMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 2010). And even in this textbook, Ti Hooper is
cited and discussed at length in a different included opinion, La Sell v Ti-State Theatr Corp., 11
N.W2d 36, 178-83 (1946), and the textbook editors note in its Preface that they have made efforts
to include longer versions of more recent cases, including those which discuss important earlier
decisions. SHULMAN ET AL., supra, at iv. From this brief survey, it seems indisputable that The
Ti Hooper remains a touchstone for teaching the specific question of the role of custom in
negligence cases.
83. The T.J. Hooper In re E. Transp. Co. v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 737 (2d Cir.
1932).
84. Id
85. Id. at 739.
86. Id at 740.
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help prevent that risk turning into disaster so effectively that not to have
them on board is, in effect, negligence. In Judge Hand's formulation,
"[T]here are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission.""
This decision would have been nonsensical if the majority had not
taken the larger technological and social context into account. As the
decision points out, two of the crewmembers on board the T.J. HOOPER
owned personal radios although those radios were not working at the
time." In other words, radios are a commonplace item that even a
working-class crewmember would own." Radios are not expensive,
complicated nautical equipment, but small, cheap playthings that can
also save lives and valuable cargo. Moreover, there were twice-daily
weather updates issued by the United States Weather Bureau via radio
that would have prevented the captains of these boats from proceeding.
Most telling in this decision are the equation of having a working radio
on board with "seaworthiness" and the majority's determination that
"[t]he injury [to the coal companies whose cargo was lost] was a direct
consequence of this unseaworthiness," placing liability for the injury
squarely on the owners of the T.J. HOOPER and the MONTROSE.90
Nowhere in the decision does the majority spell out any of this.
Indeed, the decision is succinct, disposing of counter arguments in a few
short phrases. The decision takes for granted that if tug boats are not
using "new and available devices" like radios, then the common custom
for tug boats cannot equate to reasonable prudence." Certainly, for
thousands of years, ever since the inception of maritime travel, boats
have taken the risk of going out to sea without being able to predict the
weather. However, by 1932, the tugboat industry had not kept up with
technological and market developments-not just the invention of the
radio, but the pervasiveness of affordable radios in the marketplace. In a
87. Id.
88. Id. at 739.
89. Radio ownership in the 1930s approximated the level of television ownership today:
In its day, radio was easily as proportionally popular as is television today: in 1937, an
estimated 24,500,000 families owned a radio, adding up to about 80,000,000 individual
listeners. [Four million] families reported owning more than one radio in their homes,
and about 4,500,000 automobiles were equipped with radios. When all the math is
done, approximately 33,000,000 radios were in operation in 1937, about the same total
number of automobiles and telephones combined.
Amenca in the 1930s: The Structue of Adverising, U. VA., http://xroads.virginia.edu/-
CLASS/am485_98/graham/structure.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.
cc/QFV5-LGTC.
90. The TI Hooper, 60 F.2d at 738-40.
91. Id. at 740.
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world in which radios were not available, or were prohibitively
expensive, the court could not have come to this determination. But in
1932, the cost of not using a radio was so high compared to the price of
the device, and the benefits were so great, that not installing radios in all
tugboats could constitute a breach of duty on the part of the owners of
the T.J. HOOPER. Context matters.
While a very different kind of case, Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v Kent
depends as heavily on context for its logic.9 2 A basic contracts case,"
Jacob & Youngs addresses the fundamental question of how courts
handle disputes over issues of defective performance, in this case a
contractor installing the wrong kind of pipe in a plumbing system.94
Once he learned of the mistake, the homeowner insisted that the
contractor rip out the walls, remove the offending pipe, and replace it
with the kind named in the contract-all at the contractor's expense."
Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the majority of the New York Court of
Appeals in 1921, held that the contractor was not required to completely
demolish and redo the work simply to fulfill the terms of the contract, for
several reasons. First, the defect was likely insignificant in relation to the
project as a whole, although the pipe that the subcontractor laid was
slightly less expensive than the one for which the homeowner asked and
had paid." Second, "the cost of completion [was] grossly and unfairly
out of proportion to the good to be attained."" Third, the rule of
"compensation for defects of trivial or inappreciable importance[] has
been developed by the courts as an instrument of justice.""
Cardozo's invocation of justice here signals the work of
contextualization in the decision. Certainly, Mr. Kent did not get the pipe
he wanted, and in a perfect world he would have. And the ideal of
contract law is to return the parties to the position they would have been
in had the contract been executed as agreed upon. However, that was not
possible here without enormous effort and expense on the part of Jacob
& Youngs; effort and expense that, in Cardozo's opinion, far outweighed
92. 230 N.Y 239 (1921).
93. That is to say, taught to beginning lawyers with similar frequency to the T Hooper
case. A review of the most recent editions of fifteen commonly used Contracts casebooks found
complete or edited versions of the Jacob & Youngs opinion reprinted in every single one.
94. The installation was "neither fraudulent nor willful. It was the result of the oversight
and inattention of the plaintiff's subcontractor.... Even the defendant's architect, though he
inspected the pipe upon arrival, failed to notice the discrepancy." Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y at
241.
95. Id. at 240.
96. Id. at 241.
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id. at 245.
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the breach of contract." More importantly, there is a larger issue here.
Not only would it be unjust to expect Jacob & Youngs to go to heroic
efforts to undo their mistake, but requiring contractors to stop at nothing
to keep to the letter of every element of a contract is unjust in a systemic
way for two reasons. First, people occasionally make mistakes that are
minimal in effect but so difficult to correct, that it is simply wrong to
require the correction." Second, the entire construction business
depends upon the understanding that, on the one hand, contractors should
do their best to fulfill the requirements of a contract and that, on the
other, property owners should recognize the truth of the maxim "people
make mistakes."'"' Without these understandings, the construction
business might grind to a halt; contractors would have to factor into their
costs the price and time of expensive and lengthy fixes of minor
mistakes. Building contracts would, in effect, include insurance against
repairing small but difficult-to-fix mistakes, thus passing the expense on
to the customers who would not object to such errors to benefit those
very few who would.
This seemingly minor issue, then, represents a larger attempt within
contract law that tries to calculate the difference between the value of
what a contract promises and the costs each party might have to pay in
the wake of the contract being breached. Rather than just sympathizing
with each party, Cardozo acknowledged the complexity of a construction
contract and the multiple adjustments and compromises required in such
a transaction. This is not simply a one-to-one exchange or even a
contract for services to be rendered. It is a machine with many moving
parts, any one of which could go wrong, but not all of which have equal
weight or value. In a rapidly expanding state like New York at the
beginning of the twentieth century, houses were going up all the time.
Contractors worked with carpenters, electricians, plasterers, plumbers,
and any number of other tradesmen, who sourced their materials from
innumerable suppliers of mass-produced goods like tile, brick, pipe, and
glass, each of which differs in major or minor ways. To reach the
conclusion that he did, Justice Cardozo did not need an intimate
knowledge of the building trades; however, he did need to recognize the
context in which houses were built, the construction industry could
thrive, and homeowners could afford to hire contractors.
99. Id
100. See Spence v. Ham, 50 N.Y.S. 960, 963 (App. Div. 1898).
101. See generally 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 42:4 (4th ed. 2013) (describing the
contract law doctrine of substantial performance).
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These are just two cases, of course, but the fact that they are both
different from each other in content, historical period, and area of law
while also being bedrock cases for legal analysis in contracts and torts
allows them to suggest just how much context matters in legal decisions.
We include these cases in textbooks and explicate them to our students so
that they can learn this central fact. The genius of judges like Benjamin
Cardozo and Learned Hand is analogous to the skill of a masterful
cinematographer: they can move crisply and smoothly between
foreground and background, individual actors and larger themes, taking
into account the details of the case while, at the same time, taking in the
panoramic sweep. This kind of contextual understanding is the primary
factor of the cognitive empathy that is operating in both of these cases.
Both Hand and Cardozo empathized not just with the plaintiff and the
defendant, but also with larger legal and social systems: changing
technologies, the business of building houses, future homeowners, and
contractors.
III. JuDIcIAL REASONING IN PATTERSON v. HUDSONAREA SCHOOLS
This model of facts and context clarifies why courts have come to
such different conclusions in cases on homophobic bullying. While there
is rarely disagreement on the basic facts of each case, the context in
which these cases are adjudicated and the ability of judges to tap into the
real-world circumstances of bullying-that is, their ability to tap into a
contextualized, empathetic interpretation of the case-is inextricable
from their understanding of the facts. We can see this tension in the
collection of homophobic bullying cases I now turn to, especially in
Patterson.
The facts in Patterson are no less disturbing for being
straightforward and familiar. Dane Patterson 02 underwent nearly
continuous bullying at school from sixth grade until tenth grade, when he
finally dropped out of Hudson High School and began taking classes at a
local Catholic school before enrolling in college placement courses. His
parents sued the school district, alleging that the bullying Dane
experienced at school had effectively denied him a public education
102. To protect the then-minor plaintiff, the circuit court opinions observed the convention
of referring to him by the initials D.E Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 E3d 438, 461 n.1
(2008). But because his last name was included in the initial opinion (through his parents as
plaintiffs), his given name was used throughout the district court opinion and his full name is now
a matter of public record. This Article therefore uses his full name throughout.
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under Title IX.'o3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan found for the school district, and on appeal, a divided
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that
Dane's circumstances warranted a successful Title IX claim.14
It is important to understand that Dane Patterson's case is hardly
unusual. It is not necessarily even the most egregious example of
homophobic bullying.' Most striking, in fact, is how similar it is in
structure to so many other such cases around the country: in each, one
child is singled out as the victim of repeated, ongoing harassment and
physical violence, not just by one other child but by a whole cohort of
other students. The child is either openly gay or perceived to be gay, and
the bullying continues despite what can often be the best efforts of the
school until that child either drops out of school or, in the most disturbing
cases, commits suicide."
Courts, in these cases, have been split on whether they find for the
school district or the child, specifically in how they interpret the Title IX
regulations dealing with sexual harassment,' an issue I discuss in more
detail in Part III of this Article. Regardless of the cases' outcomes, the
103. Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201137, at *4-5 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 28, 2007).
104. Patterson, 551 F.3d at 450.
105. This dubious honor perhaps belongs to the plaintiff in the first case successfully
holding that a school district may be liable for failing to curb repeated instances of antigay
bullying. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 E3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996). According to plaintiff's allegations
in the case, Jamie Nabozny was frequently subjected to verbal abuse, held down by fellow
students for a public simulated rape, punished for leaving school without permission after the
mock rape, attacked multiple times in school bathrooms, and finally beaten in a public hallway so
badly that he eventually collapsed from internal injuries, only to be laughed at when he
complained by the assistant principal supposedly in charge of school discipline. Id. at 451-53.
106. See id; Doe v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, No. 11 -cv-01999-JNE-SER (D.
Minn. Mar. 5, 2012) (copy of consent decree archived at http://perma.cc/L83D-HZW4); Estate of
Brown v. Ogletree, No. ll-cv-1491, 2012 WL 591190 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012); Pratt v. Indian
River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 E Supp. 2d 135 (N.D.N.Y 2011); Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch.,
419 E Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist., 377 E Supp. 2d
952 (D. Kan. 2005); Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 4:CV-01-1463, 2003 WL 23718302
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2003); Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285 (2008);
L.W v. Toms River Reg'1 Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535 (N.J. 2007); Hannah Bolt, TheAnoka-
Hennepm Lawsuit: How Anti-Gay Bullyig Was Sex-Based and 'Neutrality' Created a Hostile
Envronmen4 26 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 265 (2013) (discussing Anoka-Hennepn Sch. Dist.); Sabrina
Rubin Erdely, One TownI War on Gay Teens, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 12, 2012, at 50 (discussing
Anoka-Hennepn Sch. Dist.); see also EMILY BAZELON, STIcKs AND STONES: DEFEATING THE
CULTURE OF BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARAcTER AND EMPATHY 57-81, 143-
66 (2013) (discussing the case of Jacob Lasher).
107. Title IX prohibits students' exclusion from any educational program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). Because
almost all public school districts receive at least some assistance from the federal government, the
provision applies to virtually all public education in the country.
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courts are applying the same legal rule: the schools in question may be
liable for peer-to-peer bullying only where officials have demonstrated
"deliberate indifference" to the plight of the bullied student.' 8 When the
harassment follows a specific pattern, in which the bullying is
perpetrated by a series of students and in which the school takes
immediate action against each individual student for each specific
incident, the issue for the courts is whether the actions of school officials
contributed to a denial of the child's access to public education.
The divide among courts addressing these cases is not necessarily
evident beyond the opposite conclusions they reach.'" However, when
we bring the concept of judicial empathy into the analysis, this split
makes a lot more sense. Just as the judicial empathy critics might
predict, courts that find for the plaintiff, who alleges that the school
inadequately handled bullying, appear to empathize with the plaintiff.
That is, the decisions speak explicitly about what it means for a child to
have to navigate a hostile environment in which harassment is a symptom
of a larger pathology of victimization by a group. For these courts,
schools that simply react to individual incidents of bullying when they
appear to be part of a larger social context are indifferent to the actual
circumstances of the plaintiff's situation.
By contrast, courts that find for the defendants, while often
sympathizingo with the plaintiffs and lamenting their experiences of
harassment and violence, tend to analyze schools' reactions to bullying as
appropriate responses to a series of isolated, unrelated incidents. If
schools discipline perpetrators, organize antibullying workshops, or
provide safe spaces for bullied students to eat lunch or do their
homework, these courts consider those measures as more than adequate
proof that school officials were working to help the child and counter
harassment."' But such conclusions were not inevitable given the facts
108. A standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
109. As will be discussed in Part 1 hiia the legal standard for relief in such cases
requires a determination that school officials were "deliberately indifferent" to the plaintiffs'
plight, so these decisions are necessarily quite fact-specific. But the facts alone do not seem to
dictate whether courts will find complaints actionable under Title IX. Though the sample size we
are working with is too small to generate reliable statistical evidence, drawing from these
decisions anecdotally, the seriousness of the harassment alleged in bullying cases does not seem
to correlate with the likelihood of courts' relief to the plaintiffs. Moreover, many of the cases
analyzed in this Article were considering motions for summary judgment; as a result, the
decisions necessarily view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
110. That is to say, following the Dicdonary of Modern Legal Usage definition, feel
compassion for the difficulties they face. See GARNER, supa note 28, at 312.
111. An excessive focus on individual actors as opposed to systemic problems underlies
Nan Stein's critique of both zero-tolerance rules and the conflation of harassment with bullying.
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of these cases. While both kinds of outcomes issue from the same body
of law and even ask similar questions-that is, whether schools were
doing an adequate job in addressing bullying and providing access to
education in the way that Title IX requires-the framework with which
the court contextualizes what is happening to the bullied child is
inevitably the defining and deciding factor in all of these cases.
It is not immediately obvious what legal remedy is available for
teens who are bullied or harassed by their peers. If appeals for assistance
from school officials cannot halt the abuse, what recourse is available?
Their fellow students are not state actors, and sexual orientation
discrimination is not specifically prohibited under federal law or by
many states.H2 But in the landmark decision of Nabozny v Podlesny, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a
school district's egregious and knowing disregard of antigay bullying
could be actionable on constitutional grounds."'
According to the facts alleged in his complaint,"4 Jamie Nabozny, a
middle school student in Ashland, Wisconsin, was continually verbally
and physically harassed by classmates after he came out as gay in the
seventh grade."' Fellow students called him "faggot" and hit and spat at
him."' The school guidance counselor and principal (named defendant
Mary Podlesny) promised to protect him, but did not follow through on
this promise."' In fact, shortly after that promise, Nabozny was grabbed
by a fellow student who mimicked raping him as twenty other students
watched and laughed."' The abuse continued through eighth grade, until
Nabozny attempted suicide."9
After being released from the hospital, he transferred to a local
Catholic middle school.'20 Upon returning to public school in ninth
Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment? The Missing Discourse of Rights in an Em ofZero
Tolerance, 45 AIz. L. REv. 783, 799 (2003) (cautioning that framing bullying as individual
"meanness" overemphasizes individual motivations and may dilute discrimination protections and
undermine protections already afforded in law).
112. Currently, federal law and many state laws do not prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation as a protected category. However, even in the absence of sexual-orientation-
specific civil rights legislation, where such discrimination is implicated it can at the very least be
subject to rational-basis review. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 E2d 454, 463-65 (7th Cir. 1989).
113. 92 F.3d 446,458(7th Cir. 1996).
114. Taken by the Seventh Circuit as true for the purpose of determining whether
summary judgment was properly granted by the District Court below. Id. at 450.
115. Id
116. 1d. at 451.
117. Id
118. Id.




grade, Nabozny was physically assaulted and verbally harassed
continually.12' The principal of the high school took no action against the
various perpetrators, and within a few months, Nabozny had attempted
suicide again.12 By tenth grade, the abuse had escalated so much that it
culminated in a group of eight boys repeatedly kicking Nabozny in the
stomach, leading to internal bleeding and another hospitalization.2 3 After
each episode, school officials promised to act but did nothing.24 By the
middle of eleventh grade, the school guidance counselor told Nabozny
that school administrators were not willing to help him and he should just
leave the school if he wanted to end the abuse.'25 Nabozny moved to
Minneapolis, and, as well as seeking medical help, he hired a lawyer and
sued the principals of both the middle school and high school in Ashland
for gender discrimination.126
When the case was first heard, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, determining that Nabozny had "failed to
produce evidence to establish that the defendants either created or
exacerbated the risk of harm" that the other students posed to him.'2 7 The
Seventh Circuit reversed.'28 Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983,129 the court
concluded that Nabozny had cognizable equal protection claims but
dismissed his due process arguments.' Observing that it was
"impossible" to imagine that school leaders would be equally cavalier if a
girl in their care had been subjected to Nabozny's treatment, the court
concluded that Nabozny could, therefore, claim gender-biased disparity
in treatment by school officials."' The Nabozny case was organized
primarily around Fourteenth Amendment issues, but it served as notice
that homophobic bullying in school settings could be analogized to male-
on-female sexual harassment and that protections against such
harassment might apply. Though many of the precise legal issues in this
case differed from those in subsequent cases, two questions were settled:
12 1. Id.
122. Moreover, more than one teacher told Nabozny that this was the kind of treatment he
could expect for being openly gay. Id. at 451-52.
123. Id. at 452.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 452-53.
127. Id at 453.
128. Id at 454.
129. Providing for a right of civil actions against persons or institutions for civil rights
violations under the Constitution. Id. at 453.
130. Id.at460-61.
131. Id. at 454-55.
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(1) homophobic bullying is a civil rights issue and (2) failing to prevent
that bullying might be an actionable offense.
Shortly after the Nabozny decision, in Davis v Monroe County
Board of Education, the Supreme Court decided that Title IX may
require school officials to take steps to stop peer-to-peer sexual
harassment.' Though circuits had previously been split on whether Title
IX covered student-to-student harassment as well as harassment by
teachers or other school employees, the Court concluded that school
officials' "deliberate indifference" to ongoing student harassment might
be actionable under Title IX if the conduct were severe enough to
effectively prevent the victim from receiving the benefit of a public
education.'"
The Davis opinion opened the door to further Title IX claims
alleging deliberate indifference in instances of repeated and uncontrolled
peer aggression in the public schools, while Nabozny made space for
victims of homophobic bullying in schools to sue school districts and
school administrators by arguing gender discrimination even in states or
municipalities lacking explicit civil rights protections on the basis of
sexual orientation. Thus, in many recent lawsuits addressing
homophobic bullying in school settings, plaintiffs asserted that the abuse
they experienced constituted sexual harassment under Title IX. 34 These
plaintiffs argue that even if sexual orientation is not itself protected under
Title IX, harassment and discrimination claims connected to homophobia
and sexual orientation may be asserted as occurring "on the basis of sex"
when they intersect with gender-that is, if the victim was targeted in
gendered terms or because he or she was perceived as violating the
gender norms generally thought to accompany heterosexual
identification.'
132. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
13 3. Id.
134. However, some of those cases are also, or alternatively, predicated on state
protections. See, e.g., L.W. v. Toms River Reg'1 Schs. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J.
2007) (regarding a bullied plaintiff seeking relief under New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination).
135. And they often are. Homophobic violence is frequently tinged with slurs about the
victims' alleged violation of gender norms. Consider, for example, the kinds of comments Jacob
Lasher reported from his classmates. Lasher was labeled with feminizing tags like "pussy" and
"bitch" and was told by school administrators and other students to become more masculine in his
appearance: "Lose the makeup, lift weights, lose the faggot voice . . . ." BAZELON, supra note
106, at 59, 73. Or the many references to gender stereotypes catalogued in the Anoka Hennepin
case. Bolt, supra note 106, at 270-71. Another example of the frequent slippage between
targeting bullying victims for their supposed homosexuality and for their alleged gender hyper-
sexuality or gender nonconformity may be found in Vance v Spencer County Public School
Disbic4 231 E3d 253 (2000), which deals with a female plaintiff who was alternately harassed by
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When such student-on-student claims are brought, then, courts must
now apply the deliberate indifference standard articulated by the
Supreme Court in Davis. According to Davis, a prima facie case of peer
sexual harassment must demonstrate:
(1) that the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school, (2) that the
funding recipient [the school system] had actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment, and (3) that the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent
to the harassment.3 6
As it happens, in Patterson and all the other cases discussed in this
Article, the first two elements are not truly in dispute. It is generally
assumed'" that the harassment students suffered was "severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive," and students and/or parents reported the abuse
to school officials.138  As I discuss below, the standard of "deliberate
indifference" to the harassment is what is at issue, but deliberate
indifference is difficult to prove because plaintiffs have to show that the
reaction of a school administration was not just negligent, but
intentionally so-that is, they have to prove that schools had the tools at
their disposal to end the harassment but chose not to do so.'3
While the facts of Nabozny are deeply disturbing, they are hardly
unique. Instead, they seem almost paradigmatic of subsequent decisions.
In 2003, a Pennsylvania couple sued a school district after their son had
been subjected to three years of being called "fairy," "fag," and "peter-
eater."'40 In 2008, Megan Donovan and Joseph Ramelli sued the Poway
(California) United School District in response to four years of being
verbally and physically harassed by classmates, including one incident
where a student circled them and shouted, "Fucking fags, fuck you guys,
stupid d[y]ke, stupid d[y]ke.""" Both students left their school and
enrolled in a home-school program.4 2 Jonathan Martin, a student in
being called "gay" and by being baited or propositioned in overtly sexually aggressive ways by
male classmates. Id. at 256-57.
136. Soper v. Hoben, 195 E3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 631-42).
137. Either because this has been established at trial, or because the pretrial summary
judgment disposition of the case places an appellate court in the position of presuming petitioner's
complaints are true.
138. See, eg., Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201157, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2007).
139. Seeid.at*7-1l.
140. Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 4:CV-02-1463, 2003 WL 2371802, at *1-5
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2012).
141. Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Cal. App. 4th 567, 582-84 (2008).
142. Id. at 583.
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Michigan, was routinely insulted with homophobic slurs, physically
assaulted, and subjected to ongoing vandalism of his locker and
belongings.'43 Similarly, in Kansas, Dylan Theno sued the Tonganoxie
Unified School District for its alleged indifference to the relentless name-
calling, sexual harassment, and humiliation that he suffered over the
course of four years, ending only when he stopped attending school and
received his GED.'" Asher Brown's parents sued his school in Texas in
the wake of his suicide.45 Asher had been harassed with homophobic
and religious slurs, and his parents' suit listed numerous incidents in
which students would run into him and simulate anal intercourse.'46
In many ways, then, Dane Patterson's case is quite typical. In sixth
grade, classmates started a routine of name-calling and physical abuse,
which escalated over the course of seventh grade.'47 Although his
situation improved in eighth grade for reasons I will discuss below, once
Dane entered high school, the harassment worsened.'48 Not only did he
face an almost-daily barrage of insults and pushing and shoving, his
belongings were defaced with slurs, and his gym locker was broken into
and vandalized, as was his school locker.'49 In May 2005, Dane was
physically assaulted by another student, who forced him into a corner and
rubbed his penis and scrotum on Dane's face and neck.'s Another
student blocked the door so Dane could not leave."' Shortly after this
incident, Dane stopped attending classes at Hudson High School.152
Dane and his parents complained regularly to school officials, and
(with a few exceptions) the officials took swift and targeted action
against the perpetrators of the harassment.' As soon as teachers and
143. Martin v. Swartz Creek Cmty. Sch., 419 F Supp. 2d 967, 968-71 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(recounting allegations that plaintiff was routinely taunted with sexually explicit comments,
which escalated into defacement of his locker and physical confrontations).
144. Theno v. Tanganoxie Unified Sch. Dist., 377 E Supp. 2d 952,954-61 (2005).
145. Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, No. I1 -CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
21,2012).
146. Id Brown's case may in fact have been complicated by the fact that he had been
diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome three years before he died. Id. However, the harassment
Asher experienced did not seem to focus on differences due to his disability, and instead were
either sexualized ("gay," "faggot," "queer," "AsherAIDS,"), religion-based ("When Asher
responded that he was Buddhist, the bullies would laugh at him and tell him he was going to
hell"), or both (students "made sexually derogatory comments alluding to Asher having sexual
intercourse with Buddha"). Id. at * 1-2.
147. Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 E3d 438, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2009).
148. Id. at 441-42.




153. Id at 439-44.
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administrators learned of an incident, they disciplined the responsible
students, both counseling the perpetrators and, in the case of the
vandalism and physical assault, suspending and even expelling
responsible students.'54 In the summer between seventh and eighth grade,
they worked with Dane to set up special education services for him and,
in eighth grade, assigned him to work an hour per day with Ted Adams, a
teacher who ran the school's resource room.'" There, Dane could find
respite from the abuse, work on his academics, and learn skills for
dealing with his peers-an arrangement that, in large part, accounts for
his success during eighth grade." As each incident of bullying was
reported, school officials took action against the alleged perpetrator, and
the records generally show that those particular students did not bother
Dane again (although other students quickly took their place)."
Nonetheless, with the exception of eighth grade, Dane said the
bullying was relentless. Rather than easing over time in response to
school officials' clear opposition to this behavior, the harassment
intensified and culminated in a serious and violent sexual assault.'
Dane's parents sued the school under Title IX, claiming that Hudson Area
Schools was "deliberately indifferent" to Dane's harassment at the hands
of his classmates.' They argued that, although Dane's middle and high
schools took individual action at each specific incident of harassment,
the schools had done nothing to change the systematic pattern of bullying
that Dane endured.'" The schools responded that not only had they acted
appropriately to Dane's specific situation, they had also worked to
educate students about the destructive effects of bullying and cultivated a
no-tolerance policy toward harassment."'
In this context, in which there are a number of cases on
homophobic bullying, why focus on Patterson? First, this case has three
separate and strongly written opinions: the district court decision, the
circuit court decision, and the circuit court dissent. All three opinions
use convincing and persuasive legal reasoning to come to their
conclusions, and they all take the facts of the case and the dangers of
154. Id at 441-43.
155. Id at 441.
156. Id.
157. Id at 444.
158. Id at 442-43.
159. Id. at 443.
160. Id
161. Id The school's general efforts to combat peer harassment are discussed in further
detail by the District Court. Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., No. 05-74439, 2007 WL 4201137, at
*7-9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2007).
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bullying seriously. However, their very different approaches to the same
facts lead to strikingly different analyses. Each opinion's way of
understanding and framing the cultural context in which the undisputed
events took place created diametrically opposed conclusions.
Second, each opinion understands the standard of "deliberate
indifference" and its connection to school actions differently. The school
administrators in Patterson were not as callous and victim-blaming as the
principals and guidance counselors in Nabozny. They did not blame
Dane Patterson for what happened to him, and they attempted to
intervene. They made clear that he should not be bullied. But each
Patterson decision very differently positions the court in relation to the
parties involved.
A. The Tial Court & Opinion
Because this was a decision for or against summary judgment, the
district court did not challenge the veracity of the narrative that the
Pattersons presented.'62 Rather, it moved immediately to evaluate the
Pattersons' claim that Hudson Area Schools could be liable under the
three-pronged analysis introduced in Davis- (1) a sustained pattern of
harassment that denied the plaintiff access to public education, (2) the
school district's knowledge of this pattern, and (3) the schools' deliberate
indifference to this harassment.' The court handily determined that the
harassment "could be considered severe, pervasive, and objectionably
offensive," and the fact that Dane stopped attending school in tenth grade
"constitute[d] sufficient evidence to create ... a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his access to educational opportunities and benefits
provided by the school was adversely impaired and/or denied," meeting
the first prong." The court found it similarly easy to conclude that
plaintiffs alleged facts showing that the schools had sufficient knowledge
of harassment to warrant liability, satisfying the second prong.'
Thus, for the district court, the main issue to analyze was Patterson's
claim of deliberate indifference. In response to this claim, the court
observed, "[A]dministrators at Hudson Area Schools repeatedly took
adequate and effective remedial action reasonably calculated to end
harassment, eliminate the hostile environment and prevent harassment
162. Patterson, 2007 WL 4201137, at *4.
163. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 E3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000).
164. Patterson, 2007 WL 4201137, at *6 (finding that ongoing harassment for two full
school years in a three-year period was sufficient to qualify as severe, pervasive, and
objectionably offensive).
165. Id. at *7.
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from occurring again."'" The court took seriously the plaintiffs'
argument that Dane's situation was not just a series of isolated incidents
but was part of a larger homophobic and aggressive ethos among
students.' The court took note of several affidavits from students,
former students, teachers, and the guidance counselor affirming that
"Hudson Area Schools had an environment of (a) profanity, (b) sexually
derogatory treatment of students by other students, (c) jostling and
pushing of students into lockers by other students, and (d) allowing
certain students to be picked on and teased before and after school and
between classes."' Moreover, the court also recognized the severity of
the treatment Dane endured and did not belittle the seriousness of
homophobia in general.'69
Nonetheless, the court found for the defendants.'o Throughout the
opinion, the court looked at the phenomenon of sexualized harassment
and homophobic bullying from the vantage point of the school district's
efforts to eradicate student-on-student harassment. Rather than focusing
on Dane's story in the "Analysis" section of its opinion,"' the court
looked closely at the policy statements made by Hudson Area schools,
the in-service trainings of teachers and administrators, the all-school
assemblies and antibullying videos that students went through, and the
specific disciplinary actions the schools took against the students who
perpetrated the acts of harassment and violence against Dane."'
The court detailed six specific steps that Hudson Area Schools took
to address bullying. They adopted a written policy prohibiting all kinds
of harassment, including sexual harassment."' While the principal did
not adopt all the recommendations of the middle school's guidance
counselor, she did bring in outside speakers to talk to students and staff
about bullying and participated in preexisting campaigns against
harassment, including a program called "Positive Peers," which "was a
166. Id. at *8.
167. The court notes that the slurs of "gay," "fag:' and "queer" were part of the everyday
discourse of children at the Hudson schools, and that "the other forms of poor and mean spirited
behavior (pushing and shoving, teasing, etc.) also were directed at many students other than
Dane." Id. at *9 n.4.
168. Id at *9.
169. Seeid.at*ll.
170. Id at*12.
171. Though Dane's allegations regarding his experiences are described in the
"Background" section of the opinion, id at * 1-4, the legal reasoning articulated in the "Analysis"
section, id at *4 11, perhaps due to the summary judgment posture, shifts almost entirely to a
narrative of the school administrators' actions.
172. Id. at *5-12.
173. Id. at *9.
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mentoring service aimed at addressing kindness, bullying, peer pressure,
and conflict resolution."' Hudson Area Schools implemented policies
that required that all public spaces be under adult supervision.' Students
received a copy of the school's code of conduct, which explicitly
addressed bullying and harassment, and student conduct was an ongoing
element of the middle school Health curriculum.' Finally, the school
took disciplinary action against all students who were found harassing or
attacking Dane."'
Consequently, the court concluded, "While Defendants' actions may
not be exactly what Plaintiffs desired and while their actions may not
have yielded the results Plaintiffs hoped for, applicable law provides that
the Plaintiffs do not have a right to dictate the actions Defendants take."'
This statement is hardly exceptionable, but it reveals how the court
contextualized the case. Throughout the decision, the court looked
through the perspective of the school board; both implicitly and
explicitly, the court asked what else a reasonable person could expect of
Hudson Area Schools that it did not already do. Through the policies,
trainings, videos, peer mediation programs, assemblies, and
punishments, the school district exhausted its options for addressing
Dane's particular situation.
This approach is most clearly in evidence in the court's response to
the Pattersons' claim that Dane was frequently told by administrators
"that there was nothing that could be done about alleged sexual
harassment unless names and proof of the perpetrators could be provided
or determined."'" From the schools' perspective, their hands were tied if
they could not take direct action against specific perpetrators.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs' claim that the school was overrun with
"ongoing pervasive harassment of children not in the 'in-crowd' was, in
the court's view, not only not ammunition for their argument that school
administrators ignored their responsibility to Dane, but legally irrelevant
and even potential evidence that the schools did what they could under
the circumstances.' In this, the court seems to suggest that, because
middle and high schools are breeding grounds for unkind and belittling
behavior from popular children toward various outcasts, Dane Patterson
could not expect Hudson Area Schools to be able to fully address the
174. Id.
175. Id. at *10.
176. Id.
177. Id at *8-10.
178. Id. at *10.




problem. As long as it took some form of remedial action, the court
concluded, the school had met its legal obligations."'
The question that pervades the court's analysis is, What would we
want a school district to do in response to bullying, and to what extent
did Hudson Area Schools do those things? The court focused on school
policies, programs, and activities that address bullying and harassment.
The court observed that even the plaintiffs acknowledged that
"'everyone' who worked for Hudson Area Schools characterized the anti-
harassment policy as a zero tolerance policy"' and disagreed with the
Pattersons' argument that "because every teacher deposed testified to
knowledge of verbal sexual harassment occurring regularly within the
schools, the cries of zero tolerance ring hollow."'" Rather, the court took
the school system at its word, arguing that such a policy cannot rid the
schools of all harassment and can be expected only to respond to
harassment as it occurs.'84
Most importantly, the district court decision did not really focus on
Dane Patterson at all. Only one of the six measures the court highlighted
had any connection to his particular situation, and the court did not even
mention his name in its enumeration of the steps Hudson Area Schools
took. Instead, the court concentrated more broadly on the efforts the
school district was taking to eradicate harassment of all kinds, including
sexual harassment, in order to benefit all children. The court
contextualized the case from the perspective of school policymakers,
empathizing with the role of the administrator rather than focusing on the
situation of any particular child.'
B. TheAppellate Majority
When the plaintiffs appealed the summary dismissal of their claims,
the circuit court did not dispute any of the district court's assertions about
the efforts Hudson Area Schools made to combat harassment and
bullying.' The circuit court recognized that the schools made attempts
to address bullying and punished individuals who attacked Dane.' For
the circuit court, though, these efforts were beside the point.'"




185. Of course, the sixth measure listed by the court is the disciplinary action taken against
individual perpetrators of Dane's harassment. Id at *10.
186. Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438,439 (6th Cir. 2009).
187. Id.at448-49.
188. Id. at 449.
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The majority opinion contextualized the facts and issues in this case
very differently from the trial judge below.'" Rhetorically, the majority
related the series of events in the case, not from the perspective of the
school and its policies, but from what it imagined would be Dane's point
of view. The court opened its narrative with a characterization of Dane
as "distraught, anxious, and angry,"' cited his belief that the school-
mandated apologies of various students were "not ... sincere," 9' and
described his feelings about no longer having access to the eighth grade
resource room.' Though much of the majority's analysis hinges on the
appropriate legal standards to apply to summary judgment in this case,'93
by closely reading the way the court construct the facts at hand, we can
see the narrative it constructed. For the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, the question to ask seems not to be. What would we
want a school to do about peer harassment? But, what was happening to
Dane Patterson in this school district, and how could officials have
attempted to alleviate Dane's (alleged) abuse?
In this context, the schools' piecemeal approach to stopping
bullying by punishing individual students was not just ineffective, but
also willfully ignored the way that bullying operated in this case and the
effect of this harassment on Dane Patterson. The court averred, "We
cannot say that, as a matter of law, a school district is shielded from
liability if that school district knows that its methods of response to
harassment, though effective against an individual harasser, are
ineffective against persistent harassment against a single student."94
Approvingly quoting the discussion in Theno, the court agreed that the
bullying in this case did not consist of "discrete incidents of harassment,"
but instead consisted of "severe and persistent harassment that lasted for
years, with other students engaging in the same form of harassment after
those who were counseled had stopped."' As in Theno, the court
observed that the steps Hudson Area Schools took to combat the bullying
of actual children were not productive-they were too generalized in
some ways, speaking only to vague ideas of "kindness" and "respect,"
and too targeted in other ways, punishing individual bullies without
189. See id. at 439-44.
190. Id. at 440.
191. Id at 442.
192. Id. at 441.
193. And a fair amount of it is devoted to extended footnotes explaining in some detail just
how wrong it believes that dissenting opinion is in characterizing those standards. Id. at 445 n.6,
447 n.7.
194. Id at 448.
195. Id at 446-47.
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addressing the consensus that Dane Patterson was an appropriate victim
of harassment and violence from any student who was inclined to
persecute him."'
The appellate majority did not give nearly the same amount of
attention or credit that the district court did to Hudson Area Schools'
generalized efforts to combat harassment.'" For the circuit court, the fact
that none of these measures had any effect in actually stopping the
persecution of Dane Patterson demonstrated that their efficacy was
limited. Given its insistent focus on the specific narrative of Dane's
harassment, the court appears to have concluded that the existence of
these various policies failed to prove that the schools were not
deliberately indifferent. Indeed, these policies seemed to be operating on
a wholly different register from what was taking place on the ground in
the schools themselves, and reasoning otherwise would be naive.'
The court seized on the word "pervasive" as central to its analysis.'"
Instead of viewing the incidents of Dane's abuse seiatim, as did the
district court, the circuit court saw them as functioning collectively. The
majority insisted that Hudson Area Schools should have recognized that
simply disciplining individual perpetrators was "not stopping the overall
harassment of [Dane Patterson]; it is undisputed that [Dane] continued to
have problems with other students, even after some were reprimanded or
even disciplined."2" Therefore, continued the court, "Hudson's isolated
success with individual perpetrators cannot shield Hudson from liability
as a matter of law."29'
Significantly, the court noted, the one effective measure that
Hudson took to counteract the bullying as well as help Dane both
emotionally and academically-assigning Dane to work daily with Mr.
Adams in the resource room in eighth grade-was no longer available
once Dane entered high school.202 Even though the Pattersons "begged"
the principal to reassign Dane to the resource room (which was in the
middle school wing of the same building that housed Hudson High
School),203 the school allowed him to meet with Mr. Adams for only
196. Id at 447-48.
197. In fact it barely discusses these measures, which is legally appropriate given that the
procedural posture in the case requires courts to consider plaintiff's allegations in the most
favorable possible light. Id. at 447 n.7.
198. Id. at 449 n.9.
199. Id at 448.
200. Id
201. Id. at 449.
202. Id
203. Id. at 441.
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twenty to thirty minutes per week and returned to "the same kind of
verbal reprimands that it had used unsuccessfully in response to the
sixth- and seventh-grade harassment."2" For the majority, this may have
been a sign of deliberate indifference: the schools had found a solution
that worked, but because of bureaucratic inflexibility, abandoned it as
soon as Dane moved into high school.
While the crux of Hudson's defense was that it took immediate
action against specific students; for the majority, this argument "misse[d]
the point."2"' It responded directly to the dissent's claim that Hudson was
"100% effective" in responding to the harassment" by asserting, "One
can make such a statement only if he ignores the realities of [Dane's]
situation."207
By putting "the realities of [Dane's] situation" at the heart of its
analysis, the appellate majority directly countered the orientation of the
district court's opinion. Through its insistence that the only way to
accurately evaluate this case was to comprehend Dane's circumstances,
the court defined the harassment primarily as an experience undergone
by the victim, rather than a difficult set of conditions for a school system
to handle. Once the court made this move toward empathizing with
Dane, its decision became wholly logical. That is, if the court could see
things from Dane's point of view, Hudson Area Schools should have been
able to do that, too. The fact that they chose not to, the court concluded,
could be found by a jury to constitute deliberate indifference.200
In overruling the district court, the circuit court majority was not so
much disputing the lower court's interpretation of Title IX as it was
reorienting the focus of the inquiry. In the eyes of the majority, the
school was responsible not just for its policies, but for the well-being of
all of its students. While the district court argued that one cannot expect
a school system to eradicate bullying (a not unreasonable defense, given
how entwined structures of social power are in middle and high schools),
the circuit court countered that Hudson could be expected to recognize
that Dane's suffering was not reduced by any of their policies or
programs. Rather than seeing the success of Dane's experience in the
eighth-grade resource room as an asset to the school's argument that they
took advantage of the resources available to them, the court instead
asserted that Hudson prioritized separation between middle and high
204. Id at 449.
205. Id
206. Id at 452 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
207. Id at 449 n.9 (majority opinion).
208. Id at 450.
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school teachers and facilities above Dane Patterson's ability to thrive in
school. This kind of bureaucratic rigidity was, for the circuit court
majority, a symptom of Hudson Area Schools' single-minded investment
in a set of ineffective strategies.
C The Appellate Dissent
The dissent, authored by Judge Vinson (sitting by designation from
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida), was
also organized around the legal standard of deliberate indifference.209 It
noted at the outset the very high legal standard which must be met for
relief under Title IX. Observing that "a school district is not deliberately
indifferent unless it knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the
student's health and safety 2 o the dissent cited cases in which courts set
specific standards for Title IX violations, cases in which schools refused
to take any action or made no effort whatsoever,' in which deliberate
indifference was characterized by a situation where "school officials
[were] aware of the misconduct but didnothing to stop it."212
These citations clue us into the dissent's direction. Judge Vinson
expressed sympathy with Dane, observing that "this is a sad case," but
arguing, "[T]he plaintiffs have clearly not met the high legal standard for
deliberate indifference."" To support this stance, he enumerated every
single instance of harassment in which Dane complained to school
officials and the steps taken to respond to each incident. Because no
individual student was reported to have harassed Dane again, Judge
Vinson asserted, "[T]he only reasonable conclusion from the undisputed
facts in the record is that the school's actions, with respect to those
offenders, were 100% effective."214
A detail of the case that, for the majority, was a telling symptom of
the school's deliberate indifference to Dane's suffering-his removal
209. Id. at 451 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
210. Id (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The dissent's reliance on
Farmeris questionable. While the decision does use this description to characterize the deliberate
indifference standard, it does so in the context of the Eighth Amendment standards for humane
conditions in imprisonment, not in the context of Title IX. Fanner, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court's
decision in Farmer likens Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to recklessness and goes on
to adopt a subjective test for determining recklessness in that specific context. It is not
automatically apparent that the same standards are at work in Title IX harassment cases outside of
the Sixth Circuit. ButseePattelson, 551 E3d at 451 n.1.
211. Patterson, 551 F3d at 451 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
651 (1998)).
212. Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 E3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2000).
213. Patterson, 551 E3d at 451 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 452.
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from the eighth grade resource room once he reached high school-was
an insignificant detail for the dissent. Judge Vinson resolved that "the
undisputed facts do not support [the] inference" that daily access to the
resource room was a major factor in the improvement in Dane's situation
in his last year of middle school.' For the dissent, because Dane
characterized his time in the resource room as a place to meet with Mr.
Adams and "just kind of wind my day down with him, do my
homework," the resource room was "the equivalent of study hall."216
Since much of the bullying happened during the day in hallways, locker
areas, and the lunch room, "it simply [did] not follow that a study hall for
an hour each day could have reduced the harassment to an appreciable
degree."" Judge Vinson saw no real value in the daily use of the
resource room and instead concluded that the changes Dane experienced
in eighth grade must have been due instead to his interactions with Ted
Adams.' While meeting with Mr. Adams daily was not available to
Dane once he was in high school, the dissent determined that a half an
hour per week for Mr. Adams to "meet and counsel him" at the very least
indicated a good faith effort by Hudson to find a solution to a structural
problem.219
The dissent characterized the majority's contextualizing of the case
from Dane's perspective as placing an unreasonable burden on Hudson
Area Schools. Like the majority, the dissent looks to Davis's
determination that deliberate indifference is "not a mere 'reasonableness'
standard."220
[W]here a school district has knowledge that its remedial action is
inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in light
of those circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school district
has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it
215. Id. at 454.
2 16. Id.
2 17. Id.
218. Id. (observing that Dane himself could not account for the dramatic reduction in
bullying during his eighth grade year and concluding from this that because Dane did not
highlight the resource room as an important factor, it could not have played that role). That the
dissent sees important connection between the loss of the resource room and daily access to Mr.
Adams and the major uptick in harassment suggests that Judge Vinson is concerned less with
redressing the "realities of Dane's situation" and more with enumerating mechanistically the steps
that the school district took in Dane's case.
219. Id.




continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to
act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.221
The dissent insists that the majority "glosses over" the high standards of
deliberate indifference and in essence expects Hudson Area Schools to
single-handedly wipe out all harassment. "The majority seems to
interpret these two sentences to mean that even if the school district takes
disciplinary action in response to all known harassment, and even if that
action is 100% effective against the individual harassers, it may be liable
if there is subsequent harassment by new offenders."222
The dissent's repetition of the phrase "100% effective" is crucial.
According to the dissent, the school's responsibility was to respond to
each individual act of harassment committed against Dane Patterson.
Hudson could not be expected to act against students whom Dane does
not identify by name, nor to anticipate acts of harassment that have not
yet happened. For example, because Dane could not identify the children
who had vandalized his locker and the school's investigation unearthed
no names, no one was punished.223 In the dissent's opinion, the school
did all that it could: it took Dane's complaint seriously, and investigated
it as soon as it could. Unfortunately, despite its best efforts, the school
was not able to discipline the offenders.224
The distance between the dissent's framing of this case from the
majority's contextualization of it can be found in a footnote that may
appear at first glance to be a throwaway observation. The dissent raised
the majority's assertion that
[Dane] was teased, called names, and pushed and shoved "on a daily basis"
while he was in the sixth grade.... Despite the daily nature of this
harassment, [Dane] admit[ted] that he made only a "total of a couple of
reports regarding [the] incidents that took place" during that school year.225
This, for the dissent, was proof that the Pattersons had unreasonable
expectations of what the school was capable of and that Dane was not
actively pursuing an end to the harassment. If he was teased and bullied
daily, why was he not reporting these incidents to teachers every day?
Why were there only a few reports over the course of the year rather than
the hundreds that would reflect the severity of the abuse? If Dane did not
report these incidents, how could the school be expected to act upon
them? Or as the dissenting opinion puts it, "The school district is not
221. Id.
2 2 2. Id.
223. Id. at 452 n.4.
224. Id. at 452-53.
225. Id. at 452 n.3 (citation to majority opinion omitted).
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responsible for failing to stop harassment of which it was not made
aware, nor can it be held responsible for failing to punish harassment by
unknown individuals."26
These two opinions display radically different ways of
contextualizing this case in particular and homophobic bullying in
general. Their approaches are best exemplified by the language to which
each opinion returns more than once in explaining what happened in
Hudson. For the majority, the defining phrase in the case is "pervasive
harassment." The treatment that Dane Patterson faced was not a series of
discrete events that could be responded to and disposed of one by one.
For the majority, Dane's experience was totalizing-he underwent daily
abuse, sometimes extreme and violent, at other times lower in intensity
and mostly comprising verbal insults and teasing. However, the majority
opinion contended that harassment shaped Dane's time at school; from
the moment he walked in the door of school to the moment he left at the
end of the day, he lived in anticipation of another insult, another attack.
For the dissent, however, the quality of life that Dane experienced
on a daily basis was not, and could not be, the concern of Hudson. The
schools recognized the problem and took action. Not only did they hold
various consciousness-raising events about bullying and disrespect, they
were, in the phrase that defines the dissent's approach, "100% effective"
in responding to all the incidents of harassment about which they knew.227
The dissent used this exact phrase four separate times in its opinion in
order to point out that Hudson was the opposite of deliberately
indifferent.228 Not only did the schools act in the wake of every incident,
they were "100% effective" in making sure that specific offenders never
harassed Dane again.229 The dissent then recounted a number of cases
similar to Patterson in which schools responded directly to individual
cases of harassment, and even though the abuse continued, courts found
that schools were not deliberately indifferent.230
The dissent allowed that a school cannot "avoid liability merely by
taking some action, however minor, in response to known
harassment .... The pertinent inquiry is whether the response was
appropriate under the particular circumstances."23 As we have seen, the
226. Id. at 452.
227. One which was introduced by the district court below, but invoked as a talisman by
the appellate dissent.
228. Patterson, 551 E3d at 452,456-57,460.
229. Id. at 452.
230. Id. at 457-60 (citing Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., No. 4-CV-02-1463, 2003 WL




dissent had already addressed this question: because Hudson officials
were "100% effective" in responding to reported incidents of harassment,
how could their actions be anything but appropriate? In the dissent's
words, "A school acts appropriately if it investigates what has already
occurred, reasonably tries to end any harassment still ongoing by the
offenders, and seeks to prevent the offenders from engaging in such
conduct again."232
The dissent expressed sympathy for Dane's "sad case," but if it was
empathizing at all, it was only with the day-to-day work of Hudson
officials. For the dissent, effectiveness was instrumental, even scripted.
The school's responsibility was to respond to specific offenses and to
make sure that every individual perpetrator of harassment did not
commit further offenses. None of the harassers bothered Dane again, so
the school was "100% effective" in preventing more abuse by those
students. After all, no school can (or should) predict which students
would offend in the future; the best they could do was make clear that
bullying was not tolerated by Hudson and discipline students on a case-
by-case basis.
While I cannot agree with the dissent's perspective, I also cannot
fault it for being unreasonable.233 Like the district court, the dissent asked
an important question: What can we expect schools to do about
harassment that, even despite what feels like their best efforts, will not
end? The majority's use of the phrase "pervasive harassment" points us
toward an answer, which the next section explores. Explicitly, the
majority was talking about the experience of harassment that pervaded
Dane Patterson's life. Here, "pervasive" means constant, never-ending,
and daily. But this harassment was not just experientially pervasive for
Dane; it was communally pervasive for Hudson Area Schools. That is,
the idea that Dane Patterson's role was the victim of homophobic
bullying pervaded his school. There was an unspoken understanding that
he was an open target for any and all children inclined to pick on him,
which is why punishing each individual incident of harassment was so
useless. In essence, the entire "in-group"2 at the school functioned in
2 3 2. Id
233. See infra note 210. A fair reading of the precedent might suggest that the dissent's
interpretation of the relevant legal standard was at best cramped, if not perhaps disingenuously
narrow.
234. This follows the conceptions of sociological thinkers who suggest that one important
way that groups develop cohesion and a sense of self-definition is by identifying and
distinguishing themselves from those perceived as outliers. Through this process of setting
boundaries the group cements its notion of just who belongs within the group while bonding
those within it by their shared denigration of outsiders. See, e.g., KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
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tandem, casually harassing any children who seemed to be outliers but
focusing their energies in particular on Dane. Once we understand this
context, we can get much further in understanding how this kind of
harassment works, what schools might do about it, and how courts can
respond to it.
IV. UNPACKING "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE"
One reason the bullying cases examined here all seem so similar is
that homophobia is a pervasive bias in U.S. culture. Moreover,
homophobia is intimately connected to the enforcement of gender norms,
so that children and adults who violate those norms are often interpreted
as gay or lesbian. The language of homophobia and the language of
gender conformity can be indistinguishable: "faggot" can mean "gay
man" and/or "feminine man"; "dyke" can mean "lesbian" and/or
"masculine woman." And of course, preteen and teenage children, who
absorb and reproduce homophobic attitudes and language while also
being deeply concerned with social hierarchies and who fits where on the
ladder of popularity, are primary enforcers of homophobia and gender
conformity. Given all of this, we should not be surprised that
homophobic bullying in schools is so predictable, brutal, cruel, and
relentless.
This insight, while hardly original, can help us understand not just
the raft of cases discussed here, but also the ways in which various
courts' contextualization of the situations they are evaluating and on
which they are ruling play out. In short, if courts recognize that
homophobic harassment is not just experientially pervasive but
communally accepted, they are more likely to find for the plaintiffs in
bullying cases. I will work through the mechanics of this kind of
bullying in a holistic way; that is, in a way that sees homophobic
harassment as a symptom of a larger set of social processes that identify
victimhood as an existential phenomenon and the practice of that
harassment as a routinized element in the social life of a school.235 Once
PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1966) (building on the work of earlier
sociologist Emile Durkheim and criminal records from seventeenth century Massachusetts
Puritans to show that behavior outside of group norms helps build coherent social order); see also
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOLED IDENTITY (1963)
(discussing labeling and the discrediting of outsider groups such as homosexuals as a common
function of human society).
235. which at least some scholars argue is consistent with the direction of more recent
attempts to legislate against antigay bullying. James Maguire argues that the 2010 Massachusetts
bullying legislation moves away from a "robust notion of individual agency" towards a
"contagion model" of broader social conditions. James Maguire, "Everyone Does It to
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schools have a meaningful analysis of the problem of homophobic
bullying that recognizes it as systemic, systematic, and a process that
generalizes homophobic abuse even as it particularizes its victims, both
schools and the courts will have better conceptual tools to understand
what "pervasive harassment" really means.
Of course, bullying may be grounded in gender differences236 or
race,237 or may simply be specific to the child singled out regardless of
minority. Even within the narrower context of homophobic bullying, not
all children victimized are gay.. and not all openly gay children are
victimized. Indeed, it is entirely possible that in some of these cases
there were openly or semi-openly gay children who escaped the routine
abuse suffered by the various plaintiffs. We can imagine a Venn diagram
of "kids who are (perceived to be) gay" and "kids who are bullied," in
which the overlap designates "kids who are (perceived to be) gay who are
bullied." Sometimes the victim falls into other derogated groups that
further single the child out from his or her classmates; the child may be
Everyone'? An Epidemic ofBullying and the Legislation of Tmansgression in American Schools,
16 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 413, 448 (2013). For more extensive examination of antibullying
legislative efforts across the country, see Samantha Neiman, Brandon Robers & Simone Robers,
Bullying: A State ofAffars, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 619-39 (2012).
236. As is demonstrated in the many opposite sex (usually male to female) peer sexual
harassment cases brought under Title IX, including Davis and Vance, see infm notes 133-135 and
accompanying text.
237. For a few egregious recent examples of race-baiting bullying, see Williams v Port
Huron School District 455 E App'x 612, 614-18 (6th Cir. 2012) (examining a case in which
African Americans in a school district fraught with racial tensions were subjected repeatedly to
racial epithets, taunts, anonymous distribution of white supremacist literature and a widely
distributed "hit list" featuring a noose and target list of students of color); and Zeno v Pine Plains
Central School District 702 E3d 655, 666-68 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the case of a student
subjected to racist name-calling, vandalism, and threats of physical violence including lynching).
238. See, eg., Tyrell v. Seaford Union Free Sch. Dist., 792 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (concerning high school student who allegedly suffered years of harassment and
homophobic slurs following a drunken incident in which another girl allegedly engaged in sexual
conduct with her).
239. Studies reveal an enormous amount of antigay harassment in American schools. In
the 2009 school climate study by Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network (GLSEN), for
example, 84.6% of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender students surveyed reported experiencing
verbal harassment within the past year, and 61.1% said that they felt unsafe at school as a result of
their sexual orientation and/or gender expression. GLSEN, THE 2009 NATONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE
SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR
NATION'S SCHOOLS 22-26 (2009), available at http://glsen.org/sites/default/files/2009%20
National%20School%20Climate%2OSurvey/o2OFull%20Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
H6PF-TUTP (showing a positive trend in decreasing antigay epithets over time, and a correlation
between antibullying efforts and gay-straight alliances with decreases in homophobic
harassment). Even with such staggering statistics, however, the increasing prevalence of self-
identified gay, lesbian, or bisexual children in primary grades means that at least some of those
children escape all or at least the most serious forms of homophobic harassment from peers.
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overweight,240  have a learning disability,2 4' be economically
disadvantaged,242 belong to a minority religion,243 be new to the school,24
or have already been the subject of sexualized rumors.245
Occasionally, the children in these cases are openly gay (as in
Nabozny,24 6 Marin, 24 7 and Donovad48), but while the victim's coming out
might have been the catalyst to the abuse, most of the subjects of
harassment are not identified as actually gay either in their own
narratives or in the court decisions. Moreover, even those who are
actively pursuing heterosexual relationships may nevertheless be targeted
by their fellow students as "gay."249 Most important here, though, is the
fact that the victims of homophobic bullying are perceived to be not just
gay but also "faggots" or "dykes"-that is, outside the boundaries of
human society and hence appropriate subjects of abuse and shame.250
We might call this person the "kid who is bullied," but his or her"'
status within the school is the person whom others are entitled to
harass. 25 2 This status requires a kind of social consensus among the other
students, a microculture of bullying that might expand casually to include
240. Patterson v. Hudson Area Sch., 551 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Estate of
Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-CV-1491, 2012 WL 591190, at *1, *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012).
Brown was allegedly called "fat pig" by his peers, despite the fact that the court indicates that he
was of "slight build." Id.
241. 2012 WL 591190, at *1 (noting that Brown had been diagnosed with Asperger's
Syndrome and "displayed some of the more common side effects" of the disability).
242. 2012 WL 23718302, at *2. According to the plaintiff's complaint, a classmate said
publicly that Doe's "family is poor and [his] mom's a whore." Note, however, that Doe may not
otherwise have stood out from his peers. The court takes pains to note that Doe possessed a black
belt in karate and was attempting to complete requirements to become and Eagle Scout. Id
243. 2012 WL 591190, at *2 (detailing Brown's teasing for being Buddhist among his
Christian peers in Texas).
244. Id at *16.
245. 377 E Supp. 2d at 954-61.
246. 92 E3d at 451.
247. 419 E Supp. 2d at 968.
248. At least with respect to the named plaintiff. Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,
167 Cal. App. 4th 567, 583 (Ct. App. 2008). The record about the sexuality of Donovan's
coplaintiffs is not clear. Id.
249. See, e.g., RYAN's SToRy, http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2014), archivedathttp://perma.cc/8NE-MGRC.
250. As hip hop artist Eminem observed in attempting to explain why his repeated use of
the word "faggot" was not in itself homophobic: "The lowest degrading thing you can say to a
man ... is to call him a faggot and try to take away his manhood .. . . 'Faggot' to me doesn't
necessarily mean gay people." Richard Kim, Embem-BadRap., THE NAION, Mar. 5, 2001, at
5, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/eminem-bad-rap, archived at http://perma.cc/
JJ92-C3AJ.
251. A few of these cases, most notably Donovan, include victims who are girls. However,
the overwhelming majority deal with homophobic bullying of boys.
252. See George W Smith, The Ideology of "Fag": The School Experience of Gay
Students, 39 Soc. Q. 309, 327-28 (1998).
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other victims, but is focused on a single subject. In all these cases, the
offenders seemed fungible; as we saw in Patterson, when one perpetrator
was identified and disciplined and ceased participating in the
harassment, others soon stepped up to take his or her place. In this
context, homophobic bullying is not a series of abusive incidents, but a
social dynamic that is self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing.253
The structural realities of this kind of bullying require more than
just targeted responses to discrete incidents. As the circuit court in
Patterson recognized, homophobic harassment is "pervasive" and
constructs its own set of realities. The ongoing cultural acceptability of
homophobia in the United States contributes significantly to this
phenomenon, even if the characteristics that the perpetrators focus on
have little to do with sexual orientation.254
In these cases, "empathy" requires a set of cognitive processes that
allow schools, judges, and ideally fellow students to not just feel bad for
children like Dane Patterson, but to recognize several interconnected
phenomena: (1) that the operative word in "homophobic bullying" is
"homophobic"; (2) that homophobic bullying is concerned with both
victimizing and shaming its victims, because to be called a "faggot" is to
be considered less than fully human; (3) that homophobia pervades our
culture and, by extension, our schools; (4) that in this context,
homophobic bullying is a project undertaken within a microculture as
large as a whole school or as small as a sixth grade class; (5) that
homophobic bullying constitutes not just a set of offenses but the threat
of harassment at any moment for any length of time; and (6) that the
experience of the victim of homophobic harassment is totalizing-his or
her day is spent either anticipating, dealing with, or recovering from
harassment, and managing the shame of being the designated "kid who is
bullied." Meaningful empathy requires an intellectual and affective
253. For example, if Dane Patterson did not report the abuse, then his bullies could act
with impunity. But if he did report it, he was breaking the microcultural consensus that he was
the outsider, which might subject him to further bullying.
254. Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-cv-1419, 2012 WL 591190 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2012), provides a clear example of this. The victim's disability, weight, and Buddhist religion
amid a Christian-majority community all contributed to his targeting as "the kid who is bullied'"
Id. at *1-3. However, the terms in which he was harassed were primarily about his presumed
homosexuality. The anti-Buddhist harassment was framed in sexual terms, in which students
made sexually derogatory comments alluding to Asher having sexual intercourse with Buddha.
Id. at *2. Asher was a social misfit in many ways: he "had poor social skills, horrible
handwriting, was awkward and clumsy, and had a hard time understanding nuance. In addition,
Asher was short for his age, of slight build, and not athletically inclined. He spoke with a lisp and
preferred choir to gym class." Id. at *1. As a sixth grader, it is unlikely that Asher expressed
much in the way of sexual preference for other boys; rather, his inability to enact a standardized
masculinity, and his social and athletic awkwardness defined him as "the kid who is bullied."
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appreciation of (1) the mechanisms of homophobic harassment on a
structural level and (2) the lived experience of victimization for the
subjects of that harassment.
How would the deployment of this kind of contextualized empathy
work in the schools and the courts? Certainly, schools cannot abrogate
their responsibility to discipline students participating in harassment and
violence toward other children, but they must also educate the broader
school community about bullying and homophobia (among any number
of discriminatory attitudes).255 However, contextualized empathy requires
schools to work actively to counter homophobia as such and to see
homophobic harassment as more than certain students behaving badly
toward other students. Seeing the experience of a child like Dane
Patterson in context means seeing this kind of harassment as a form of
psychic terrorism that polices the entire community by punishing those
students who stand out in one way or another, and by designating one
child as the sacrificial lamb to the homophobic and gender-normed rules
that control all students.
In many ways, it is easy to speculate how courts could take a
contextualized view of homophobic harassment cases that privileges
cognitive empathy with the plaintiffs. Patterson provides one model of
this, although the circuit court focused more on empathizing with Dane's
experience as "the kid who is bullied" than on contextualizing the
operations of homophobia and gender-norming at Hudson Area Schools.
The court recognized the most important element of this phenomenon,
however: that homophobic bullying is a cumulative, microcultural
expression of interchangeable actors against a single object and must be
dealt with as such. In those terms, the Patterson dissent does not make
sense: from the majority's perspective, to argue that Hudson punished
perpetrators and told students to be more respectful toward each other,
and hence were not deliberately indifferent, manifests a lack of
understanding that borders on purposeful ignorance. The kind of
instrumentalist approach the dissent in Patterson took is then easily
dismantled by the majority.
255. A good amount of scholarship suggests that such education is effective. See DAN
OLWEUS, BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN Do (1993); BAZELON,
supra note 106, at 193-293; HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., AN INTRODUCTION TO
WELCOMING SCHOOLS (2009), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/images/general/An
Introduction to WelcomingSchools.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7AQ-UECS (offering
empirical support for the effectiveness of its antibullying program). For recommendations for
more comprehensive legal and legislative responses that can combat antigay bullying, see R. Kent
Piacenti, Toward a Meaningful Response to the Problems ofAnti-Gay Bullying h American
Public Schools, 19 VA. J. OF SOC. PoL'Y & L. 58 (2011).
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The question of whether it is genuinely wrong for a court to find for
the schools in these kinds of cases is actually more complicated. Does
contextualizing this kind of harassment in terms of the culture of
homophobia preordain outcomes for plaintiffs? Not necessarily,
although it does alter the balance of power (no small thing, since most of
the courts in the homophobic bullying cases adjudicated so far did, in
fact, find for the defendants). The use of contextualized empathy toward
the victims of homophobic bullying might not change the outcome of
any individual case, but it does put a thumb on the scales in favor of the
plaintiffs by taking their experiences seriously and naming the power of
homophobia. This is a significant difference from existing decisions,
even ones that find for plaintiffs, and it requires using a different
analytical framework.
In Patterson, the district court's opinion that Hudson did all it could
by instituting policies and guidelines to counter bullying is not
unreasonable."' But even that argument would look different if it treated
Dane Patterson's situation as part of a larger syndrome that manifested
itself within the microculture of Hudson Area Schools, especially if this
analysis were contextualized by the half-dozen other cases that followed
the same trajectory (or ended even more tragically) and the hundreds that
never made it to the courts.
More to the point, if the district court took homophobia into
account, how different would its decision look? The district court could
still make a number of the same arguments. After all, acknowledging
that there is homophobia in the world is not the same thing as eradicating
it. Understanding harassment in the context of widespread homophobia
shows us what an immense task it is just to counter bias in the classroom,
hallways, and lunchrooms. Schools are hardly equipped to make this
kind of widespread social change, especially in an era of shrinking
resources. A school district's obligation is to educate; it is unreasonable
to make them responsible for eradicating homophobia in their schools
and undoing the antisocial behavior in which preteen and teenage
256. For extensive recommendations of what schools can actually do to decrease the
likelihood of bullying, see Dan B Weddle's, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between
Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMPLE L.
REv. 641, 699-703 (2004); see also Michael J. Ritter, Teachbig Tolerance: A Harvey Milk Day
Would Do a Student Body Goo4 19 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 72-79 (2009); cf Ari Ezra
Waldman, Tormented: Antgay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMPLE L. REv. 385, 438-42 (2012)
(defining homophobic bulling as a serious social problem to be addressed but arguing against
criminalization of bullying or cyberbullying).
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children so often participate.2" A fully contextualized analysis can only
take schools so far toward effectively putting a stop to homophobic
harassment.
Still, we can imagine an approach that differs from the one the trial
court adopted while maintaining the same sympathies and even the same
conclusion. In this alternate-universe decision where cultural
homophobia is acknowledged and homophobic victimization is seen as a
fairly common force that must nonetheless be challenged with every
possible effort to ensure that it does not infest the school's culture or
coerce any particular student, a court could still legitimately conclude
that individual school systems had satisfied their legal obligations toward
bullied plaintiffs. Rather than enumerating the various antibullying
programs. in which the school system participated and the policies they
implemented, the district court would ask what efforts the schools took to
counteract the microculture of victimization in which a boy like Dane
Patterson becomes "the kid who is bullied." That is, the court would
analyze how Hudson worked to disrupt the social status gained by other
children for victimizing Dane, while taking seriously the limits on a
school district's ability to change wide-ranging and strongly held biases
against sexual and gender minorities. Such a decision would start from a
position of genuine empathy for both Hudson Area Schools and Dane
Patterson, while recognizing that it is profoundly difficult to reconcile the
two.
V. REGARDING CONTEXT
This discussion raises an important question: Can a court have a
fully contextualized understanding of homophobic bullying and still find
for the schools in cases like Patterson? Certainly, reasonable people can
differ on the extent of a school's responsibility. It is possible for a school
to do all it can to foreground the destructive power of homophobia and
discipline individual students without the student at issue finding relief.
To be frank, however, this is unlikely. In none of the cases reviewed for
this Article was the word "homophobia" even mentioned, even though
every single one of the male plaintiffs was called "faggot," "queer,"
and/or "homo" and associated with acts of masturbation and oral and
257. Or as the court concludes in Davis, and the Patterson majority approvingly quotes, the
legal standard under Title IX "does not mean that [schools] can avoid liability only by purging the
schools of actionable school harassment." Davis, 526 U.S. at 648, cited in Patterson v. Hudson
Area Sch., 551 F3d 438, 456 (6th Cir. 2009).
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anal sex with other men and boys.' The children in these schools were
surrounded by homophobia-it was essentially in the air that they were
breathing-but the courts could not see how powerfully that context
affected every single student, whether they were gay, victimized, or not.
A contextualized view of homophobic bullying cases takes into
account what Judith Butler calls a "livable life."259  The "kid who is
bullied" is denied the possibility of a livable life in the context of the
school environment; he or she is reduced to a singular identity: object of
the abuse of others. Only by empathizing with that subject position in
context-that is, analyzing how homophobia operates, recognizing that it
dehumanizes, and understanding the microcultural consensus that
constructs these victims--can a court accurately evaluate homophobic
bullying cases.
Given how many of these cases exist, and assuming that courts are
at least sympathetic to the plight of victims of homophobic bullying, why
is this kind of contextualized empathy so hard to find in the case law?
Why do courts that acknowledge the seriousness, pervasiveness, and
violence of the treatment many of these children experience still rule in
favor of school systems? That is, why can they not recognize the
systemic nature of homophobic bullying and the social context in which
it thrives in schools?
Maybe it does not even occur to courts that they are permitted to
consider perspectives outside of what they define strictly as "the facts"
and "the law." That is not to say that the courts' points of view are
separate from any kind of context. Nor are they without contextualized
empathy. With few exceptions, the courts' empathy here lies with
administrative systems, in line with a worldview that believes in the
power of public policy and disciplinary systems to fix discrete problems.
Because this worldview is so common-indeed, it is pretty much a
requirement for a career in the law-it is invisible to the courts. For the
Patterson district court opinion and circuit court dissent, the facts of the
case were structured by a series of unspoken assumptions about the
relationship of individuals to institutions and the centrality of policy and
rules in shaping people's lives and experiences. These opinions were
shaped by a sense that systems, like schools, operate appropriately from
258. It could be argued that this is due to the strictures of Title IX, which requires sexual
harassment on the basis of gender, and which does not have room for discussions of sexual
orientation. However that would fail to take into account the fact that sexual orientation
discrimination may be protected insofar as it overlaps gender discrimination. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
259. See JuDrr BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 25-27 (2004) (describing a "livable life" as
one in which a person feels recognized by others as deserving of human dignity).
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the top down and that as long as the necessary measures are taken,
institutions are not liable for the quality of the lives of those who
populate those institutions.
Courts that find for schools in homophobic bullying cases are rarely
callous or explicitly biased against LGBT plaintiffs. But they are often
structurally incapable not just of empathizing with the world in which the
plaintiffs live, but with recognizing that their contextualization of the
case leads them to see the facts in a predetermined way. Taking lived
experience into account is empathic not merely in affective ways: it is a
cognitive, intellectual process that is inextricable from legal reasoning.
One might argue, in fact, that contextualized reasoning requires a level of
intellectual activity that decontextualized reasoning does not. It
necessitates stepping back from one's own intuitive understanding of the
facts of the case and reorienting those facts from a different,
subordinated perspective. Acknowledging the pervasiveness of
homophobia is a significant intellectual exercise for those judges (indeed,
those people) not directly marginalized by it.
Does integrating empathy into legal reasoning mean that courts will
always find for plaintiffs in these cases? is not actually the correct
inquiry. Contextualized reasoning in law means manifesting empathy for
allperspectives: school systems, school administrators, bullied students,
and even the bullies themselves. Only by being able to enter into the
reasoning of each party involved can we have a fully formed
understanding of the facts.
As we have seen throughout this Article, what qualifies as a "fact"
depends on context. In legal reasoning, the facts lead us to apply certain
rules to specific situations. However, all the cases I have discussed
above, from Ti Hooperto Patterson, demand of the reader a richer, more
complex definition of "facts" that cannot be disentangled from the world
that brought them into being.
Of course, after all this contextualized reasoning, one must find a
perspective to give the most credence. However, a meaningful
understanding of homophobia, for example, would be less likely to lead
to unconscious reinforcement of homophobic beliefs or the assumption
that homophobic bullying is simply a form of unkindness.
Understanding homophobia means recognizing how micro- and
macrocultures of marginalization form, as well as recognizing how the
enforcement of sexual and gendered norms have immense and damaging
power. Finally, it means acknowledging that LGBT people have to
grapple with these norms in ways that shape their lives on a daily basis,
which, in the absence of empathy, is simply invisible to nongay people.
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This is the kind of empathy that Sonia Sotomayor was talking about
and that Senators Jeff Sessions and Lindsey Graham seemed incapable of
comprehending. Sotomayor was arguing that her experience with
marginalization gave her the opportunity to contextualize facts in a way
that her wealthy, white, male counterparts could not. She was making a
complex argument about the centrality of context: that it profoundly
shapes her view of the facts even if it does not necessarily determine
judicial outcomes. Senators Sessions and Graham heard that analysis as
indicating bias-that is, they argued that what Sotomayor was claiming
as a plurality of "empathy" was in fact a singularity of "sympathy."
It is not. In fact, equating empathy with sympathy works toward
promulgating bias of a different kind, preserving the dominant narrative
and erasing the perspectives of the marginalized. It can be argued instead
that Senators Graham and Sessions believed that integrating a variety of
perspectives into legal reasoning is tantamount to bias because they
failed to recognize their own single-minded empathy toward dominant
context, which, of course, is, itself, a form of bias.26 They see the world
from a limited point of view and, unlike Justice Sotomayor, have proven
themselves incapable of looking at the question of empathetic legal
reasoning empathetically (that is, taking all perspectives seriously).
A contextualized, empathic, culturally aware approach toward a
case like Patterson does not guarantee that the court will always find for
a plaintiff and that Dane Patterson will always win, but without this
approach, we can almost guarantee that he never will.
260. See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial Empathy, 51
WAsHBuRN L.J. 61 (2011).
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